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CHAP'lER I 
ST. THOMAS' PRINCIPLE OF IHDIVIDUATI(Il 
AND 'llJE VIEWS OF OTHER 
PHIIreOPHERS 
This thesis atteupt8 to present St. Thomas I explanation ot the 
principle of individuation of corporeal substances of the same species. 
Identifying this principle as matter does not constitute a problem, but the 
interpretation of this principle has given rise to a number ot conflicting 
opinions. The effort to ~cover the authentic doctrine ot st. Thomas will 
'.~ 
require a caretul reconstruction ot the problem and an exact setting forth of 
his concept of prime matter. To these preparatory labors the second and 
third chapters of this thesis are respectively devoted. In chapter four the 
division of the commentators over the meaning of the qualifying phrase in 
St. Thomas t tuller expression of the principle of individuation as materia 
quantitate signata is presented. Chapter five proposes as a method for 
deciding between the views of Cajetan and Ferrara a reconstruction ot the 
his torical context to throw light on the meaning ot the problem. The 
interpretation that quantity tigures as a oondition ot matter in executing the 
function ot individuation having been adopted, chapter six deals with the 
COITolary question of whether quantity is detel"lQ,ined or undetermined in its 
dimensions. Chapter seven shows the harmol1Y' between st. Thomas I theory ot 
individuation and his thought on prime matter, the unicity of the substantial 
1 
i 
l 
P 
! 
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2 
f'orm, and the eduction ot material torms trom prime matter. The rest or the 
present chapter giVes a summary account ot the sources ot st. Thomas t teaching 
• 
on the principle ot individuation and, the views which betore, during or since 
his time agree or disagree with his teaching. 
,No one acquainted with Thomism seriously contests the tact that 
St. Thomas held matter as the principle of' individuation. He says it plainly' 
" 
in all his works, first and last, and in a variety ot contexts whenever the 
question arises. So that no one make capital ot an isolated phrase and 
misinterpret st. Thomas as Godfrey de Fontaines did Aristotle's nactus est qui 
diStinguitft,l let us examine the continuity ot St. Thornaa' th~ught. 
In ~ Natura Materiae the title ot the second chapter enunciates 
that "matter is the prinCiple ot individuation.n2 The opusculum ~ Principio 
Individuationis declares that "it is easy to see how matter is the principle 
of individuation.") 
There is some doubt that the works just mentioned are actually 
st. Thomas'. Dr. Bourke lists them as rejected by Mandonnet, who incorporates 
them into the IIOpuscula spuria. n4 According to Mandonnet ~ Natura Materiae 
1 Henri Renard, S.J., l!!! Philosophy ~ Being, Bruce, 2nd ad., 
Milwaukee, 1946, 226. , 
2 St. Thomas Aquinas, ~U8cula Omnia, ad. Pater Yandonnat, O.P., 
Lethielleux, Paris, 1927, V, Op. II, II, 199. 
) st. Thomas, QPuscula Omnia, V, Op. LI, 19,. 
4 Vernon J. Bourke, Thomistic Bibliograp!1z, ad. '!he Modern 
Schoolman, St. Louis, 1945, 19. 
,3 
is absent trom the so called ofticial c&talogue.S, Roland..Qosselln doubts its 
genuineness because ot the doctrinal content.6 Mandonnet doubts too the 
authenticity or ~ Principio Individuation1a, despite 1nletact that Cajetan 
identities it as a part ot st. 1homas' originall2! Potentiis COgnoscitivis, 
preserved in the Vatican Librar,y Collection.7 
In OPPosition to Mandonnet, Grabmann credits both ot these works to 
st. Thomas.8 He and Michelitsch point out that ~ Natura uaWriae can be 
tound in the book catalogue ot Ptolcmv or Luca and has been declared ge1lU.iUe 
in manuscripts ot Bruges, Avignon, Bordeaux, Paris, and Oxford. There are 
manuscripts in the Vatican, in Bruges, Paris, and other libraries that 
actually name st. Thomas as the author or De Principio Individuationis.9 
Dubious authenticity ot these opuscula does not shake st. Thomas' 
teaching of the radical basis of individuation. In other opuscula he states 
categorically that this is matter's function. .!!l Librum Boetii ~ ... :rr_i .... ni.--.t_a .... te .. 
he says "through the matter is caused a numerical diversity in the same 
species.nlO In a different context,. speaking ot essence as tound in composite 
substances, he says in ~ ~ !! Essential "matter is the prinCiple ot 
----'-5 Robert Joseph Slavin, O.P., The Philosophical Basis tor " 
Individual Differences Accordini to St. ThoiUas Aquinas, lioetor81 i5ISsertatial, 
The Cat-horic uIiIversity of America, washington, n.c., 1936, 23. 
6 Ibid. 
-1 Thomas de Vio, cajetan, De Ehte et Essentia, M. H. Laurent, O.p., 
Yarietti, Turin, 1934, II, V, 55. - -
8 Martin Grabmann, Thomas A~uinas, 'trans. V. Michel, O.S.F." 
Longmans, Green, and Co., New York,' 1911, 21. 
9 Slavin, Philosophical BasiS, 59. 
10 st. Thomas, gpuscula Onm1a, III, ~. XVI, Q'.ll, A.2, 85. 
R .. 4 44 *. • it $ • 'u ••• i,1I B 4f!¥¥'" ?*ti -c., 4)$ # &, .t J £ StA ...,.0; 41 3$ !! . 2 at ] ."JU, N3¥ .. J,I .. ,1"'~~· 
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individuation. nU 
st. Thomas' contention that matter is the root of individuation 
isn,'t simply thrown into his synthesis as an addendum. 1:t is woven into his 
opera magna as an integral part ot ,his system. Speaking about angels in the 
second book ot his commentary' on-the Sentences, St. Thomas s81'S that no form 
or nature is multiplied except through matter.12 In Contra Gentiles" 
" 
contrasting God's essence with material essences, he s~ that they are 
"individualized according to the definite matter of this or that individual. vl 
Later in another book of the same work he states: " Dlfference in point of 
torm begets difference of species, while difference in point of matter begets 
difference in number.n14 In the Summa Theologica, his final work, st. Thomas 
-. 
doesn.t depart from the opinion he had expressed so otten previOlB lye To 
round out the case tor matter' 8 role let us consider these excerpts: "Forms 
which can be received in matter are individuat4lid by matter. "1, ''Things lIhich 
---,------
, II st. Thomas, en ~ and Essence, .Armand AUS\lsti!ltJ lIa\ll"r, C.S.B , 
The Pontifical Institute oTuearaeva.r-Studies, Toronto, Canada, 1949, 51. 
12 st. 1homas, suaer Liber Sententiarum )'{~iStri Petri Lombardi, P. 
Mandonnet, O.P., Parisiis, e • 6th, P. Lethielleux, 929,' II, Dist. 3, Ques., 
1, Art. 4, 97. 
13 St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, abridge trans. Of God and !!!!. 
Creatures, Joseph Rickaby, S.J., ibe Carroll Press, Westminst8r,-v&ryiaiia; 
195o, Bk. I, Ch. 21, 3, 16. ' 
14 St. Thomas, SUmma~. ~., II, 93, 2, 173. 1, st. Thomas, Swmna Theologica, Part I, Ques. ll, Art. 3, common. 
Unless stated otherwise rel'erence to the SUmma. is to Anton C. Pegis' Basis 
Wri tinge .2! saint 1homas Aquinas, Random House, N.y. 
agree in specie I but difter 111 Dumber apee in tol'1l but are dilt1agu1abed 
materially.n16 
From lIhat St. Thanas wr1 tes, it is lB tent that in his philosopq 
matter performed the .function ot individuation. Equally clear is the fact 
that his teaching was recognized in his own time. There was no objection to 
his- evaluation of matter's role in indivlduating material. torms, but what ot 
" 
immaterial. torms? st. Thomas seemed to·sq that God cannot multiply 
individual angels wi thin the same species because there is in them no 
material. composition. He was limiting God1s omipotence. CansequentJ.y his 
"Whole doctrine of individuation was oondemned by Etienne Tempier, Bishop ot 
Paris, in May, l277. ~tenrards at Oxtord he was censured an the same groun 
, . 
by a member of his own order, Robert K1lwardby, Bishopot Canturbury. Of 
course, the condemnations -were later rescinded and St. Thomas completely 
exonerated from suspicions of heresy. 
By contrast it is 'interesting to note that St. Thomas' teaching on 
the individuation of material substances was among the theses proposed to 
the sacred Congregation ot Studies atter Pius X in a Motu Proprio, on J1me 29 
1914, prescribed that all schools ofphilosopq teach and hold the main 
points of the doctrine ot st. Thomas. )(asters ot inat! tutes submitted the 
theses to clarifY Pius' "main points. tf The Congregation examined them, 
-----.-
16 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, Q,. ,0, A. 4, c. 
- , 
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approved, and referred them to the Hol7 Father. At his 1n~tance the 
Congregation proclaimed that these theses contained olearly the main points 
of Thomism. Thesis eleven of the twent,y-tour enunciatedi17 "Matter, signed 
by quantity, is the principle of individuation, that is, of numerical. 
.. 
distinction (which cannot be in pure spirits) ot one individual from. another 
in the same specific nature." 
Though st. Thomaa l thought on the individuation of substances, in it 
entiret,y, starUed the philosophical world of his t.ime" using matt"r u the 
principle of individuation of material substances was neither novel nor 
unique. 
In its broad ou~lines, st. Tbanas borrowed the theory fran 
18 \ ., 
Aristotle. A glance at the Philosopher shows that he tathered St. ~omas' 
thought on this problem. 
In the tifth book of the Metaphysics, atter marking the various 
usages of the tam "one," Aristotle says that "in number those are one whose 
matter is one." He exemplifies: "Things that are one in number are also one 
in species, while things that are one in species are not all one in number.,,19 
17 EdoiIard Hugon, Principes de Philosophie, Les Vingt-Quatre Theses 
Thomistes, Paris, Pierre Toqu1, 19~, to: 
18 Frederick Cq>le.ton, S.J.. ! HiStory 2.! Philosop!lz, The NeYlJIl8n 
Bookshop, Westminster, Maryland, 1946, I, 308. 
19 AristoUe, Metaphysics, V, 6, (1016b 32 -1017a 7), Richard 
McKean, Random House, New York, 1941. Reference to Aristotle is to this 
edition unless otherwise stated. 
, 
. ( 
7 
Things are ~ "because their matter -either proximate matter or the ultimate 
is 'divisible in kind." COlDID9nt1ng uP.on this text St. Thomas puts it clearly, 
"Those things are one whose matter is ane. Indeed matter' as it stands under 
signed dimensions is the principle of individuation ot the form. And because' 
of this a thing has from matter that it is one in number and divided from 
20 
others." Here St. Thomas indicates that he recognizes Aristotle's principle 
ot individuation, agrees with it, and makes it more definite. 
This text ian' t singular. The same &flini ty" appears again in the 
seventh book ot the Metaphysics. Aristotle says, "This is Callias or 
Socrates; and they are different in virtue of their matter (tor that is 
di£terent), but the same in torm) tor their form is indiv1sible.a21 St. 
,. 
Thomas' echoes him: "Every species that is in matter, in this flesh and bones, 
is something ~ingular, as Callias and Socrates ••• because of diversity ot 
matter, which diversity is the principle of diversity ot individuals in the 
22 
same species." 
In the Physics where AristoUe observes that matter obviates the 
difficulties of the earlier philosophers in explaining generation and 
corruption,23 st. Thomas in his commentary interpolatf)s nand the plurality of 
things differing substantially."24 
---._----
20 St. ThomaSt In ¥etaP~icam Ar1stoteliB, ll.R. Cathala, O.P., 
Marietti, Turin" 1926, V" B, n. 81 , 262. 
21 Aristotle" Metaphysics, VII, 8, (1034& 6), 79,. 
22 st. Thomas, .!!! Metaphyslcam, VII, 7, 143" 421. 
23 Aristotle, Physics, I, 8, (19lb 30), 234. 
24 st. Thomas, Opera Omnia, ~o XIII, In Octo Libros Physicorum 
Aristotelis, Roma, Polyglotta, 1884, Cap. VIII, Lect. XIV, ,0. 
«ti: t' Ph :". tr t. r , ,: tet rntr'" 'If ; t utt ' t 177' ,nnc., 1'. : 
a 
In l2!.Spiritualibua Oreaturi8 st. 1bOJll8.8 Wles the negative aspeot ot 
material individuation. It matter is the prinoiple ot individuationl •••• 
inasmuch as it has not the natural capacitY' ot being received in something 
else," then it tollows that a given torm •••• which is not able to be received 
in something has individuation trom this very fact, because it cannot exist 
in ma.ny, but remains in itself by' itselt.n2S Comparing angelic torms nth 
Plato's Ideas, he points to Aristotle's argument that if the forms of things 
are abstracts, they: must be singular.26 
other major philosophers. betore and during st. Tbanas' era named 
matter as the basis ot individuation. Copleston claims that the Arabians in 
some way made matter the principle of individuation. Avicenna explains that 
for the reception of one -'particular specific form, prime matter has to be 
taken out of its state of indetermination and dispossed £or tne reception of 
the form, first through the form of corporei ty and then through the acti vi t;r 
of external causes that effect individuation. 27 Averroes seems to cast matter 
in the same role when he says that God educes forms from prime matter, which 
is coeternal 'With Him. 28 
Contemporaneous with Aquinas, st. Bonaventure concedes matter an 
important place in individuation. Appraising St. Bonaventure's use of matter 
. ---- .--
25 St. Thomas, ~ ~1rltual Creatures, trans. Mary C. Fitzpatrick 
and J olm J. ~'(e11muth, S.J. ~uette U. Press, Y11waukee, 1949, Art. V, ad 
8" 72. 
26 Aristotle, MetaEhysics, VII, 13, (1039a 30)1 806. 
27 Copleston, S.J., ~. E! !2!,g., II, 193. 
28 Copleston, S.J., ~. E! ~.J II, 198. 
~~~-----_i_* ______ ~ __ 4.4~* __ .~4. __ .i~.~n __ .4;a __ ~~~~'_4~ •• _A~WW~i~" ______ -----------·-'~OP------
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Professor Gllaon.s~8 there is onlr a difference of terminology in st. Thomas 
and the head of the Franciscan Schoo1. 29 He bases his opinion upon this 
passaget • 
Si tamen quaeras, a quo veniat prinCgaaliter; dicendum, 
quod individuum es t hoc al.iquid. Qu ai t hoc, 
principalium habet aeteria, ratione cuiusTorma habet 
positionem in loco et tempore. Quod sit aliquid, habet 
a forma. Individuum enim habet esse, habet etiam 
existere. Existere dat materia formae, sed essendi actum 
dat forma materiae. Individuatio igitur in creaturis 
consurgit ex dup1ici principio.30 
Evidently realizing that he is contusing individuation with 
individuality when he identifies st. Bonaventure's thought with st. Thomas', 
Professor. Gilson later clarifies b.r concluding that St. Bonaventure's 
"individuation is effectedpy the reciprocal appropriation of matter and 
form.,,31 With this view of Bonaventure, Fr. Copleston agrees: " ••• indi-
viduation arises from the actual union of matter and form, which appropriate 
one another through their union, ft like wax and a sea1.3 2 still there is a 
marked similarity in the two doctrines. It becomes less marked in the 
psychological realm where st. Bonaventure endows souls with a spiritual matter 
to allow for numerical difference apart from the bodies they inform. We will 
consider this and its implications in a subsequent Chapter. 
-----
29 Etienne Gilson, The sttr-t !!! 1(ediaeval Phi1osopq, trans. A.H.C. 
Downes, Scribner's, New York, 1~, • 
30 St. Bonaventure, Opera Qimia, Bernardini a Portu Romatlno, 
Collegio S. Bonaventurae, Quaracchi, 1885, II, Dist. III, Pars I, Art. II, 
QUaest. III, conclusio, 110. Italics st. Bonaventure's. 
31 Etienne Gilson, The PhilosoPAl of st. Bonaventure, trans. Dom 
III tyd Trethowan and F. J. Sheed,Sheed &;.rard;New York, 1938, 306. I 
32 Copleston, S.J., History £!. Philosop&, II, 272. I' 
·,=,-___ ----_____ .,.......... __ z_a _w - .... --.. --I! I!¥ ; # 4 ;;4 g ;p, h aM 4 ;;:44,4£ ,$'4; hi *'" $444. -SQ? ii.__ ,-
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Albert the Qreat, Alexander of Hales, Roger Bacon and others are 
said to have held matter, with more or less reservation, as the principle of 
. . 
individuation. However, the teaching is by no means universal among 
scholastic, old or new.33 
,.,-
Duns Scotus, as subtle here as usual, applies his distinctio 
formalis ~ natura rei to explain that ea~h individual has besides the common 
nature a haecceitas (thisness) which determines each individual being to be 
this being. SUch individuation doesn't satisf.y Thomists because it involves 
- . 
the gossamer distinction they can't put their minds on, and it leaves un-
explained how the "thisness" is individuated.34 
Occam - Nominalists in general - Aureolus, Durandus, and, later, 
Suarez agree that every entity is in itself the principle of its individuation 
This is a facile solution, but Thomists see it as merely the ennunciation of 
the problem. They would. go farther and ask why the entity of an individual is 
this entity. 
Another variation from st. Thomas' theme is Qodfrey de Fontaines' 
plan of having form serve as the principle of individuation. Form individua-
ting form constitutes a rather tight little Circle, too vicious for Thomists t 
stomachs. 
In the same vein Rosmini sees individuation in an act of existence, 
universals being non-existent but possibly existent things. His answer is 
--------------. 
33 Renard, S.J., PhilosoPhl £! Being, 227. 
34 Renard, S.J., Philosop!v £f. Being, 225 • 
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only partial. There remains t What makes the individual intrins1calJ.y' 
pOBBible?35 
This cursory presentation of St. Thomas t and al-ternate views leads 
to the fuller and more exact delineation of the problem of individuation which 
is the subject of the next chapter; 
..... - .. ------
I, 484. 
35 Charles Boyer, S.J., CUrsus Philosophiae,Desclee, Paris, 1931, 
-
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CHAPTER II 
THE PROBIEM OF THE INDIVIDUATION OF 
CORPOREAL SUBSTANCES 
This thesis is concerned with St. Thomas I explanation of the 
principle of individuation of corporeal substances of the same species. To 
put the problem pla~: "Why is this individual· this individual and not 
- .-1 
another?" We are not concerned with the difference between ham and eggs. 
Clearly ham and eggs are specifically diverse. But we are certainly 
interested in the differenee between one ham and another. They do not differ 
in so far as they are ham, because if hamness were the basis of their 
differing from each other, we would have to conclude that one is not ham or 
that they are identical. Either conclusion is obViously wrong. Since both 
are hams, their specific nature, hamness, accounts not for their difference 
but for their similarity.2 st. Thomas says it this way: if this ham were 
this ham because it is ham, then all hams would be this ham, and as a result 
---' - ---- ..-,--
there couldn't be many hams, but' only one.3 No one questions that there are 
many hams, so the reason for the this must be something besides the specific 
~---------
1 Renard, S.J., Philosophy ~ Being, 216. 
2 Ibid. 
3 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. il, A. 3, o. St. Thomas 
Uses "Socrates" and "man". The \U'iter of this thesis substi tutaa "ham" to 
indicate that the thesis is on a cosmological rather than a psychological 
level. 
~-' ~ ---.. . ',.'-_c_-·""""'~ .......... -.,.* ... "'"$ ___ • ____ .... 4"_;41;;p;""'". _"_''''~ __ P;.'''' ,"",4""""."......",_; !!,!,. __ ........ ,_, *_* .... _._. _____ . 
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nature. What it is represents st. 1homas' solution to the problem ot 
individuation. 
", 
, His solution is important to an understanding- of his philosophy 
beoause the philosophy ot Aquinas, as Slavin points out, is not made up of 
isolated dootrines but forms an integrated 'Whole with one doctrine presuming 
another and one teaohing subordinated to another.4 He goes on to show that 
an appreoiation of individual differenoes demands an understanding of the . 
prinoiple of individuation. The grasp of St. Thomas' thought on individuat-
ion tests a person's knowledge of matter and form. Gerrity explains why: 
"beoause a misunderstanding of st. Thomas' teaohing on individuation implies 
(as either cause or effect) a misunderstanding of his conception of primary 
matter, and probably Of~ubstan tial form.'" There is also an intimate 
connection between st. Thomas' theory of individuation and his thought on the 
universality of intellection. Wall sees one problem as the inversion of the 
other. ''Why,'' he asks "is it that we never attain perfeot union ,lith the 
singular objects of our understanding? If we reverse our point of view and 
ask the question with the emphasis on the nature of bodies, I think we have 
6 the question of the prinoiple of individuation as st. Thomas understood it." 
------
4 Robert Joseph Slavin, O.P., !h! Philosophical Basis for 
Individual Differences according ~ Saint Thomas Aquinas, Doctorar-Disser-
tation, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 1936, p. 53. 
, Benignus Gerrity, F.S.C., The Theo~ of Matter and Fornl And the 
Theory of Knowledge ~ ~ Philosophy if saint omas Aquinas, Do'CtOrar--
Dissertation, The Catholic University of America, lVashington, D.C., 1936, p. 
23. 
6 Joseph B. Wall, "st. Thomas on Individuation," The Modern Sohool-
man, XVIII, Maroh, 1941, 42. 
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At the start, it must be noted that we are here considering the 
principle of individuation ot material substances only. That, of course, 
• 
eliminates angels. created intellectual substances, "their act ot existing 
is other than their essence, although their essence is immaterial.na Angels 
"are limited as to their act of existing which they receive £rom above, but 
they are unlimited from below because their forms are not limited to the 
capacity of some matter receiving them.,,9 Each individual angel exhausts his 
species so that each is specifically as well as numerically different from th 
next. Specific difference lies in "their. degree of perfection in proportion 
as they withdraw £rom potentiality and approach pure act," that is, as they 
are more or less like God • 
. ~ 
Since we exclude angels from the scope of this problem, a fortiori 
we exclude God. A form that cannot be received in matter, but is self-
subsisting, is individuated precisely because it cannot be received in a 
subject.lO Said of angels, this applies preeminently to God. As the First 
Cause, purely and simply the act of existing, He is individualized by His 
II 
supreme perfection. 
What of human souls? . As subsistent substances, they too are exc1ud 
ed from our consideration, except when th~ are understood as actually info 
----_ ....... -
a st. Thomas Aquinas, ~ Beipg ~ Essence, .Armand Augustine 
Maurer, C.S.B., The Pontifical Institute of Meaiaeval Studies, Toronto, 
Canada, 1949, 51. 
9 St. Thomas, ~ Being ~ Essence, 51. 
10 st. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, Q.3, a.2, ad 3. 
11 st. Thomas, .Q!! Being ~ Essence, 53 • 
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ing a body. st. Thomas' explanation of how souls separated from bodies by 
death remain independent entities depends entirely upon his individuation of 
men, of whom the· souls were formal principles. • 
Although the soul's individuation depends on the body for the 
occasion of its beginning.since it comes into possession of its 
individuated act of existing only in the body of which it is the 
act, it is not necessary that the individuation come to an end 
when the body is removed. Since its act of existing is 
independent, once made the form of this particular body, that 
act of existing always remains individuated.12 
. st. Thomas explains that this is so because the soul is a unique 
form, the most perfect of natural. forms, having a being of its ann. It 
communicates this being, as form, to the matter, so that the being of the 
whole composite is also th~ being of the soul.13 It subsists retaining ita 
proper being when separated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural 
inclination to be united to the body." He exemplifies: "just as a light 
body remains light, when removed from its proper place, retaining meanwhile an 
aptitude and an inclination for its proper place.,,14 
In deleting spiritual substances from the scope or our question, it 
is necessary to observe that we are striking out just the "spiritual" not the 
"substance." Though we are not occupied with spiritual substances, we are 
vitally interested in substances, material substances. One ham may differ 
---.---~~ 
12 St. Thomas, .Q!!. Being ~ Essence, 52. 
13 st. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, q. 76, art. 1, ad 6. 
14 st. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, q. 76, art. 1, ad 6 • 
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from another, or one rose from the next because it haa a different shape, 
occupies a different place, and so on through the legendary "forma, figura, 
• locus, tempus, stirps, patria, nomen," which no two things can share in the 
same degree. Quite true. But form, figure, place and the rest are accidents 
that are not the ultimate constituents of individuation, but rather 
manifestations of an individual substance. Ina certain special wa:y the 
individual belongs to the genus of substance, according to st. Thomas: 
For substance is individuated through itself, whereas the 
accidents are individuated b.Y the subject, which is the 
substance. For this particular whiteness is called this 
because it exists in this particular subject. And sOI't 
is reasonable that the individuals of the genus substance 
should have a special name of their own; for they are called 
hypostases, or f.irst substances.15 , 
st. Thomas is careful to repeat in considerations of every type of 
being that accidents are no more than signs of substantial difference. 
Distinguishing between the angelic essence and its powers he notes that 
accidents follOwing species belong to the form.16 Wi til souls it is the::a.me: 
they are distinguished from their powers.17 He draws a proportion: the 
power of a soul is to the soul itself as accidental forms are to the 
Bubstantial form.18 Accidents, however, belong to the composite as does 
. ---------... 
15 St. Thomas, .§!!!. Theol., I, q. 29, art. 1, c. 
16 st. Thomas, Sum. Theol., 
-
I, q. 54, art. 3, ad 1. 
17 st. Thomas, ~. I, Dist. VIII, Quest. 5, Art. 2, ad 4. 
18 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, q. 77, art. 1, ad 3. 
-
I 
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between the quiddity and accidents of individuals &8 respective objects at 
• intellect and senses, the difference between substance and its manifestations 
is again indicated.2O Where st. Thomas does not make the observation that 
accidents are individuated by substance, not vice-versa, enthusiastic copyists 
incorporated marginal glosses into later copies of his works, e.g. in ~ 
Principiis Naturae Pauson omits Mandannet's "indeed the subject gives esse to 
the accident, namely existence, because the accident does not have esse 
except through the subject" as an interpolation.21 
Though st. Thomas asserts that nothing prevents us from sometimes 
substituting accidents fo~ substantial differences, because "substantial 
. . 
forms, which in themselves are unknown to us, are known by their accidents,.2 
such a substitution here would be misleading. Despite the fact that the terms 
we use are just accidental to the concepts signified,23 we must underline our 
objective. We are searching for the root of individuation, not exhibitions 0 
the individual. Accidental differences are not the answer, because an 
"accident, by its union 'With its subject, does not cause the act of existing 
in which the thing subsists, rendering the thing a substantial being.,,24 Our 
principle of individuation must be something substantial. 
19 Ibid. 
20 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, q. 85, art. 7, e. 
21 Vernon J. Bourke, "De Principiis Naturae" The Modern Schoolman, 
XXVII, Jan. 1951, 153. -
22 st. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, q. 77, a. 1, ad 3. 
23 I~. dist. 25, quest. 1, art. 1, ad 6. 
24 St. Thomas, On Being and Bspepc@, c. 6, 56~ 
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Coming to grips with the problem, is not individuation accounted 
for in the Thomistic synthesis by the mere fact that one substantial entity is 
• 
obviously different from another through its act of existence? St. Thomas 
says "substance is individuated through itself.n25 Doesn't thls harmonize wit 
his definition of individual: "the individual in itself is undivided, but is 
distinct from others?n 26 The existent substance is an individual, "which is 
not divided further by formal or material difference. tt27 Two things pertinent 
to the nature of a corporeal individual are found in the existent substance: 
"first that it is being in act in itself ••• , second, that is is divided from 
others which are or can be in the same species, while it is undivided in 
itse1f. n28 certainly we d? not deny that the formal or proximate principle or 
individuation is the whole entity of the individual. In its entire entity one 
individual is distinguished from other individuals of' the same species, e.g. 
Peter is different from Paul by his Itpetrinity.,,29 Our problem is not that an 
individual is a being in act and consequently different from other beings in 
act, but how it is not identical with other individuals of the same specm by 
being ~ individual in act~.30 
------------
25 st. Thomas, Sum. 'ltleol. , I, q. 29, a. 1, c. 
26 St. Thomas, Sum. 'Iheol., I, q. 29, a. 4, c. 
-
27 St. Thomas, In ! Metaph. lect. 2. 
28 St. Thomas, In IV ~. dist. 12, quest. 1, art. 1, ad 3. 
29 Fridericus Sa1ntonge, S.J., Summa Cosmo1ogiae, Du Messager, 
Montreal, 1941, 387 • 
.30 Renard, S.J., Phi1osoPAl ~ Being, 217. 
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It 18 important to dietinsuJ.8b the proximate 1'0 1.1:4. on ot tho 
individual to the s'pe cies and to another 1ndi vidual. Every . individual 1s a 
hoc al1quid containing two elements: a whatness and a t~isness. Whatness 
- , 
indicates the nature, e.g. man, rose, stone. By this element the individual 
".-
belongs to a determined species, wh:i.ch '1 t shares with 'other individuals ot 
the same species. Thisness indicates the suppositum, which is not 
comnrunicable to others. " Individual and species , individuals ot the same 
species, exclude themselves correlative through the supposite.".3l 
The corporeal individual has two separable constituents, matter and 
form, which when united, compose this individual essence, this real thing. 
Since this or that matter, does not belong to the specific nature of a 
corporeal creature and has nothing to do with the definition, it follows tha 
for the individual nature and essence is required ~ matter with ~ form 
in this suppoSitum.32 
Searching into the component principles of substance for the basis 
of individuation, there is a tendency to seize upon form. Does not the form 
give existence to the matter and accordingly to the composite? As a thing 
has existence, it has unity and individuation. True, but we must look into 
the difference between individuation and individuality before oiting form as 
--------------
---.,. e; 44 .. 
31 Slavin, O.P., Philosophioal Basis, ,8. 
32 Ibid. 
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St. Thomas' principle ot indiv1duat:1.on. Ind.1v:1.duation 18 IUl "operation wb:1.o 
the form undergoes'on being received into matter,"' sqs Gerrity. 
"Individuality," he sqs, "is a positive perfection of tfte real order. n33 
Gilson observes that really the form is the active principle of 
individuation.34 B.y this he mea;s that the form causes the composite's 
individuality, a positive perfection,. "nothing less than the concrete realit 
of the substance ••• conferred upon matter by' form and by' an efficient 
cause.,,35 Individuation is simply a name "used to indicate that natural 
forms, although universal and one when considered in themselves, are, in the 
order of being, actually realized only in particular and multiple embodi-
ments.,,36 Though matter.is the principle of individuation, it does not 
cause individuality except by being its necessary subject. Since only 
individual substances are real, the form conferring actual being also confers 
individual being. It is necessary that matter, as a subject, receive the 
reality conferred by form. This is enough to call matter the principle of 
individuation. Still an individual owes much more to form. than to matter. 
Form is the determining principle of every perfection of a substance. 
Individuating notes, as well as the existence of the composite, have as their 
active principle the form, while matter is simply the passive or receptive 
..... ----------~ 
33 Gerrit.r, F.S.C., Theo~ ~ Matter, 30. 
34 GUson, ~ Philosophy ~ St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. by Edward 
Bullough, edt G.A. Elrington, D.P., Herder, London, 1937, 219. 
35 Benignus Gerrity, F.S.C., Nature, Knowledge and God, Bruce, 
Milwaukee, 1947, 126. 
36 Gerrity, Nature Knowledge ~~, 126. 
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principle. 'Whenever st. Thomas calls matter the prinCiple of individuation~ 
he means that it is the receptive~ passive, i.e. the material principle. It 
• 
would be a mistake to conceive' of material forms as subsisting alone 
universally until they are received by matter and made individual. Apart 
,.--
from matter ~ they do not exist. The only reason why' matter exists is that 
material forma by their nature - in se non subsistens - are designed to 
constitute individuals. To fulfill their design they need a corresponding 
passive principle in which they can be received making possible their 
individuation. In this sense matter is named the principle of individuation 
by St. Thomas. Though the form is the active principle of the individual, 
it would be completel~ f~se to call it the principle of individuation. The 
, , 37 
matter individuates it by receiving it. 
Our problem is now sufficiently delineated to proceed to St. 
Thomas f solution. By way of recapitulation we may say: 1) We have excluded 
spiritual subs'tances" God, angels, and separated souls, as impertinent. 2) 
Vfe have eliminated individuating notes, since they merely manifest the 
individual. 3) We have deleted the form as the proximate principle of 
individuation by distinguishing between individuality and individuation. 
We are interested in showing that st. Thomas holds matter as the radical or 
remote principle of individuation and how matter exercises this function. I 
order to do this we have now to turn lOur attention in the next chapter to 
meaning of prime matter in the Tpomistic sense. 
--------- -
31 Gerrity" Theory of Matter" 32. 
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CHAPTER III 
'!HE MEANn'lG OF PRIME MATTER 
Though st. Thomas says')~again and again that matter is the principle 
of individuation and insists that he means particular matter, no'" cormnon 
matter such as a material essence inoludeslthis is not his complete answer. 
He explains particular matter sucoinotly as matter signed by quantity. What 
he means by this constitutes the core of the thesis. Before investigating 
the qualifying phrase, signed by matter, it is essential to accurate 
interpretation to grasp ~s concept of prime matter. 
The essence of ' prime matter is potency.2 Since in its\3lf it is 
potentiality only, and potentiality means nothing else but to be! ordained to 
! 
actuali ty,3 prime matter doe s not exist by i tsel£ .4 It is in po~n tiali ty tc 
substantial form which gives it first act, simply the aot of exi~tence. 
Apart from form. it has no existence, but with form' it makes up t~e concrete 
individual thing. In a way it is a principle of actual existenc3, since a 
1 st. Thomas, 2!!. Being ~ Essence, 32. 
2 st. Thomas, Summa Theol., I, Q, 77, A. 1, ad 2. 
3 st. Thomas, Omnia Opern, Quaestiones Disputatae, Ma:riett1, Turin-Rome, 6th ed, 1931, Vol. II, -! Malo, Quaest. I, Art. II, S. 
4 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I, Q. 7, A. 2, ad 3. 
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material form in itself ia not a being but must 1ntorm aome matter. Apart 
from its relation to fom" prime matter i8 not a reality', not even a 
potential being" since nature cannot be defined or thougltt of unless in 
terms of this relation. Still prime matter is not simply a relation, 
because since relation is merely"-Sn accident it cannot constitute a 
substantial principle. Though neither matter nor form is an efficient cause, 
as material and formal cause they necessarily cause each other. The matter 
causes the form as its subject" and the form causes the matter by giving it 
actuality, e.g. marble receives the determination of the form of a statue 
and the shape of the statue makes the marble actually a statue. Since prime 
matter is in potentiality to first act" it has no reality whatsoever apart 
from the form which gives it first act.5 
Matter and form" consequently" are not being themselves, but 
principles of being.6 Nevertheless" they are real" because they constitute 
real beings. If prime matter were a logical being, the form would have to be 
a real being" not just a prinCiple of the composite. Similarly" but its 
nature a material form is not a being but rather in a being.7 
Though prime matter is a real constituent of being" it is not an 
actual being. If it were, its union with form would be purely accidental. 
Cnly the composite is an actual being" properly speaking. Matter and form 
..... _-
5 st. Thomas" Qpuscula Onnia" De Principius Naturae" I, Op. ll" 14 
6 St. Thomas" ~." II" d. 3" q. 1" a. 6" 103. 
7 St. Thomas" Sum. Theol." I" q. ~O" a. 1" c • 
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are ens in quo and ens quo, not ens simply.8 Their existence is a composite 
in one.9 
Though matter is real, since it is dependent upon form and can 
not have an independent existence,lO it follows that prime matter was not 
created alone and later determined to multitudinous types of beings by 
receiving various types of form. st. Thomas says it was concreated, the 
11 ' 
composite being the subject of creation. Though prime matter has a cer-
tain priority of nature as that out of which everything is made, it has no 
priorit,y of time.12 
The matter in ~thing is the indeterminate principle, the purely 
passive principle. Consequently it is the passive cause !!! _fi_e_ri~ of the 
. , 
concrete object, receiving determination and being. As an intrinsic cause 
~~, a constitutive prinCiple, it is a passive principle.13 It is the 
principle that allows the composite to be acted upon by other things, but it 
is not the principle of the activities of the composite.14 
-------------
8 st. Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q. 110, a. 2, c. , 
9 st. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Leonine, Desclee and Herder, 
Rome, 1934, IV, cap. 81, quod vero tertio, 547. 
10 st. Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q. 7, a. 2, ad 3. 
11 st. Thomas, Quaestiones Disputatae, De Potentia Dei, Marietti, 
Turin-Rome, 6th ed., 1931, I, q. 3, a. 1; ad 12,39 • 
12 st. Thomas, Quaest. Disp., De Pot., q. 4, a. 1, c., 118. 
13 st. Thomas, Quaestiones Disputatae, De Veritate, III, q. 26, 
a. 2, c., 248. 
14 st. Thomas, ~aest. Disp., ~~., III, q. 2, a. 5, c., 46. 
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Grabmann sums up the nature and exis tence of prime IDa t ter nicely': 
"It is on the dividing line between reality and nothing; it is not the 
• 
really existing, but the possibility of being; it is the pure, but real, 
potentiality of the totality of physical nature. Therein its entity is 
exhausted. ,,15 
St. Thomas ascribes certain attributes to prime matter as springin 
from its essence. He calls it infinite, not as God is infinite in F.is t.'UN 
form, but because it is infinitely imperfect.16 Even its iurini ty' is im-
perfect, since it is predicated of prillle aatter secunduJa quid, b6eaus" its 
potentiality is toward material forms only.11 In potency to every sub-
stantial form, there is no accident that is not consequent to its deter-
. , 
mination by substantial form.18 
Considered apart from all forms, matter is one. However, as it 
actually exists under various forms it is not one but different in each 
individual. 
Often st. Thomas repeats that "matter exists for form." He uses 
this to point out the difference between individuality and individuation. 
15 Grabmann, Thomas Aquinas, 129. 
16 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q. 4, a. 1, c. 
17 st. Thomas, ~. Theo1., I, q. 7, a. 2, ad 3. 
18 st. Thomas, ~. I, D. VIII, q. 5, a • 2, 228. 
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"'lhere are many individuals ot one species tor the conservation ot the 
. 19 
speoies in things that are generated and corrupted." A man's b~ exists 
• for the sake of his soul, whose operations need the body, e.g. intelleotual 
lmowledge depends on the phantasm. The important thing in nature is the 
speoies, not the individual.20 Beoause the form is the end ot generation, 
matter is beoause of the form. ConsequenUy torms are not given to matter 
beoause matter is disposed to reoeive torms, but because a torm needs matter 
disposed in a oertain way to have a oertain nature.21 
A composite owes nothing positive to prime matter except its 
materiality, and this only passively because ultimately it is material 
because it has a material; form. Matter contributes nothing positive to the 
essence, but receives one or another essence depending upon what form 
actuates it. The composite1s nature of corporeal substance is due to the 
"" 
matter only as a passive principle, but to the form as an act-h~ l~rin~"'lrlt'."· 
,''\.-,. 
Adding nothing posi ti va, matter merely limits the fOl'Ill o:f the oomposi t~.""'" 
The very existenoe of matter is laid to the fact that some form oannot exist 
unless received in a subject. Matter, a neoessar,y subject for suoh forms, 
-------.... --
19 st. Thomas, Summa Theo1., I, q. 47,a. 2, o. 
20 st. Thomas, ~. Theo~ I, q. 76, a. 5, c. 
;-
21 st. Thomas, Quaestiones Disputatae, De Anima, I, q. 1, a. 8, 
ad 16. 404.· 
22 st. Thomas, ~ Bein~ ~ Essence, II, 31. 
23 st. Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q. 7, a. 1, o. 
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functions only by reason ot its end, torm. 24 The torma determine mattor to 
themselves and warrant its existence. 
. . 
Keeping St. Thomas' description of prime matter in mind, its 
essence and characteristics, we are in position to investigate what he means 
when he says that it is prime matter signed by quantity that is the principl 
of individuation of material forms. 
-, 
-----------
24 st. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, q. S, a. 3, ad 3. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONFLICTING IN'lERPRETATIONS OF 
QUANTITA~ SIGNATA 
Unmistakably st. Thomas holds that matter is the principle of 
individuation of material forms. rus we have shown. However, St. 'Ihomas 
underlines his usage of matter in this application. '~atter which is the 
principle of individuation is not any matter whatsoever, but only designated 
2 . 
matterl (materia signata)." . Contrasting God's essence and man's in Contra 
Gentiles, he observes thft man's essence is individuated "per materiam 
signatam of this or that individual, although the quiddity of genus or 
species includes form and matter in common.") Discussing man's knowledge ~r 
the singular St. Thomas differentiates between universal and individual, 
, 
noting that "materia signata is the principle or individuathm."~ 1..'1t.'~U"ly' 
St. Thomas I repeti tioua use of materia Signata establishes the fact that in 
ascribing individuation to prime matter he modifies that substantial 
principle in some way. 
u. 
1 st. Thomas, E!! Being ~ Essence, 32. 
2 st. Thomas, De Ente et Essentia, ed. Carolus Boyer, S.J., Aedes 
Gregorianae, Roma, 195Q, w:- -
3 st. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, I, 21, 23. 
4 st. Thomas, ~ Veri tate, Q. II, A. 6, 49. 
29 
'-... ,. ... ~" ...... ~ .. -~ ......... 'r~ .... ___ - __ , ...... -_, _._. _________ • _________ ""_~.-.'-~..,''''''',.c.~"-
r 
. ") .. 
30 
What does st. Thomas mean by "signed matter"? He tells us him-
self: "By designated matter (materia signata) I mean matter considered unde 
determined dimensions." Commenting upon this passage of"'De Ente et 
---
Essentia, Maurer says that a thing is designated - he translates signata as 
"designated" and equates Designatwn and signatum - when it can be pointed to 
with the finger. The individual thing can be pointed to but not defined; 
the universal is opposite in both respects. In this way designated is equal 
to the demonstrative adjective~. Derived meanings of the word are 
determined and limited.5 Taci~ Rickab,y agrees when he translates the 
passage of Contra Gentiles quoted above 881 tlspecies are individualized 
according to the defini~ matter of .this or that individual" - definite 
, 6 
matter substituted for materia Signata. The interpretations of these men 
are verified b,y ~t. Thomas '-own interchangeable use of Signata, deSignata, 
and determinata in ~ ~ !! Essentia, !!! Boetium ~ 'Irinitate, and De 
Principio Individuationis. In the last mentioned, where St. Thomas treats 
of individuation ~ expresso, it is remarkable that he does not use materia 
7 
signata, but rather "matter under determined quantity." In £! ~ and ~ 
--------------
·5 st. Thomas, ~ Being ~ Essence, 32. In translating Signata 
as designated and equating designatum and signatum claims no originality but 
pOints to Roland-Gosselin' s til· "De Ente et Essentia." Boyer uses signata 
(p.19) and deSignata (pp. 26& 3'Bj'.--
6 St. Thomas, Cont.·Gent., II, 21, Rickaqy, 88. 
--
196 • 
7 st. Thomas, Opuscula Omnia, De Principio Individuationis, 
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! Metaphysics where signed matter is explained in terms ot dimensions, St. 
Thomas hints at quantity, but in the opusculum on individuation he actually 
• 
says that signed means quantified. This clarifies .£!:. Veri tate t s double 
acceptance of matter: signed, as it is considered with a determination of 
dimensiones; unSigned, as withOU~ determination of dimensions. 8 And it is 
presumed in the Summa's e~lanation that the human intellect understands 
material things by abstraction from the phantasm: 
matter is twofold, common' and signate, or individual; 
common, such as flesh and bone; individual, such as 
this flesh and these bones. The intellect therefore 
abstracts the species of a natural thing from the 
individual sensible mat,ter, but not from the common sen-
sible matter. For example, it abstracts the species of 
man from this flesh and these bones, which do not belong 
to the species as such, but to the individual, and need 
not be considered in the species. But the species of 
man cannot be abstracted b.1 the intellect from flesh and 
bones.9 
Associating quantity with matter as the principle of individuation 
is in keeping with st. Thomas t concept of prime matter. He not only says 
10 
that considered in itself it is not the principle of diversity in a species, 
but he explains why it is not. In itself prime matter is indistinct and one 
through lack of determination of any form.ll Since it does not have parts 
12 
except through quantity, it is not divisible unless quantified. However, 
__ de __ 
-
8 st. Thomas, £! Veritate, Q. II, a. 6, ad 1, 49. 
9 st. Thomas, Summa Theol., I, Q. 85, A. 1, ad 2. 
10 St. 1bomas, In Boetium de Trini ta te, IV, 2, 85. 
- -
11 st. Thomas, II Sent. D. 30, Q.2, A.l, o. 181 
--
12 st • Thomas, ~Natura Materiae, C.III, 201. 
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it is not the quantity itself, nor the dimensions, that are the prinoiples 0 
individuation. These are only aoCidents, and accidents cannot be the oause 
of the substanoe that sustains them.13 • 
How then does quantity sign matter to enable it to function as the 
principle of individuation? Is quantity a coprinciple with matter of equal 
import in the work of individuation or does it playa humbler role as an 
indispensable condition? St. Thomas in different plaoes suggests both. .!:: 
Boetium!!! Trinitate he says: "It is patent that matter considered in itsel 
is not. the principle of diversity in species. n14 1!! 12! Natura }Jateriae he 
says: ° "Matter is indeed the principle of individuation, as it is the first 
and only subject of form~1I15 st. Thoma~ is not notorious for shiftine 
" 
positions on a topic without warning, and it is not likely that he does so 
on such a key thesis as individuation. However, he seems obscure in his 
evaluation of the quantity that signs matter in individuation. Coprinciple 
or condition? Perhaps it was so olear in his mind that he presumed his 
thought obvious to everyone. At ~ rate, among the major commentators two 
contradictory lines of thought are evident, each vouching for its 
authenticity by reference to st. Thomas' texts. Inspection of Cajetan and 
-----
13 st. Thomas, De Nat. Mat., III, 202. 
---
14 st. Thomas, In Boetium de Trinitate, IV, 2,,85. 
- -
15 St. Thomas, TIe Natura Materiae, II, 201. 
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Ferrara16 will bring out possible resolutions ot the problem. Each of these 
men was cognizant of the other's thought. Contemporaries, they allude to 
• 
each other's opinions, though not by name. 
In his commentary upon ~ ~ ~ Essentia, using the text "matter 
which is the principle of individuation is not any matter whatsoever, but 
only deSignated matter" as a pivot, Cajetan turns to the question: Whether 
matter is the principle or individuation. Du.ly de!'in.ing individual as 
ttindistinct".ll!1 a se et clistinci:mn ab aliis- and not~ the ~ pl"N-,:,::.s .. '.'£ 
ini.iTicfuation: incar.mrunieability- and distinction !'rom others or the same 
species,' he states that St. Thomas' opinion, stated in many places, is that 
, 17 Signed matter is the pri~ciple of individuation. Cajetan cites the major 
places in st. Thomas' work as the bases of his opinion. He refers to the 
Metaphysics where st. Thomas confirms Aristotle's unum per se as a 
continuum.18 In ~ ,Veri tate from the context of God's immediate knowledge 
of all things he excerpts the idea that materia signata is so essential to 
the individual that if the singular could be defined Signed matter would be 
in the detinition.19 From the same book - where st. Thomas treats of the 
intellectual knowledge of the material singular - CajetaA __ this con-
/ :-'; 0 ~V '~ 
------ / ' $ I:: 1'; 
16 Thomae De Vio, Caietani (1469 -
de Ferrara (Ferrariencis) 1474 - 1528). 
'J LOYOLA cP 
34) 'tffi1~Si~f Syl esttis 
-..f./RPt:,.R'i j 17 Thomas De Vio, Caietani, D.P., In ~ ~~a, 
Laurent, Marletti, Turin, 1934, C. II, Q. 5, >3. 
M. H. 
18 st. Thomas, ~ y Metaphysicam Aristotelis, Lect. 8, n. 876. 
19 st. Thomas, De Veritate, Q.II, A.6, Rasp., 50. 
- --~----
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sideration: matter in i teel! is not the principle of individuation, but 
matter in the singular, which is matter existing under de~rrnined 
ro • dimensions. Inter-locking these notions, he forms a double equation: 
signed matter equals the matter proper to the individual, equals matter unde_ 
certain dimensions. According~, as st. Thomas s~s, multiplication in a 
species is through dimensive quantit.1,2l materia quantitate signata. 
Though all Thomists agree that matter and quantity concur in indi-
viduation, some say that an aggregate of matter and quantity is the intrinsic 
principle of individuation, matter lending the individual incammunicabilit,y 
and quantity confeITing a distinction from other things. Cajetan labels 
this notion "materia qUaI}tatt and claims that it strays from st. Thomas' con-
cept of materia signata. By materia signata st. Thomas meant nothing more 
than "that matter capable of this quantity in such a way that it is not 
capable of any other." This matter would be an intrinsic part of Sortes' 
definition if he could be defined. Cajetan explains it this way: In the 
first generation of Sortes, i.e. the first existence of Sortes and the first 
non-existence of the preceding form and accidents, in the order of nature the 
particular composite comes into existence first. Then in the order of nature 
all the accidents follow the particular composite that per se terminates the 
generation. Matter, which is an intrinsic part of Sortes, is appropriated to 
Sortes himself, because he is a particular agent capable of no other quanti 
--------
20 st. Thomas, ~~., Q. X, A. 5, Resp., 2.'34. 
21 st. Thomas, ~. ~., IV, 65, 529. 
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than that determined to himselt. It i8 thi8 matter, according to Cajetan, 
that is called Signata. 
.. 
In fine, materia signata adds nothing to matter except a receptive 
potency (capacity) for this quantity and not that. Receptive potency does 
not add anything really distinct, says Cajetan, but he insists it does con-
tribute something real to matter that is only logically distinct from it. 
It is matter in order to this or that quantity that distinguishes material 
. 22 
things numerically. 
With this exposition in De Ente et Essentia Cajetan does not rest 
---
his case forever. Considering the same problem in his comment~ on the 
first article of the twenty-ninth question in the first part ot the Summa, 
he alters the proposition he maintained in ~~. Though he upholds 
vigorously that material substance is individuated by matter under certain 
dimensions, proper and intrinsic, constitutive and distinctive - it is 
monstrous to separate these acts in the concrete - he retracts much of what 
he said in ~~. "These, matter under certain dimensiOns, I do not under 
stand as I once exposed in the commentary on De Ente et Essentia (V), matter 
. ---
wi th a potency to quantity, since that potency ••• is in the genus of 
quantity •••• But I understand matter distinct in number, not as the subject 
of quantity, but as prior in nature, the foundation, root and cause of 
(quantity)itself.,,23 Byway of explanation, Cajetan shows thnt this is more 
---------------
22 Cajetan, In De Ente et Essentia, C. II, Q. 5, 53 - 56. 
----
23 St. Thomas, Opera Omnia, Leonine, with com. of Thomas De Vio 
Caietan, O.P., Polyglotta, Rome, 1887. Tome IV, I Pars Summa Theal., Q. 29, 
A. 1, Com., 328. 
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in conform! ty with St. Thomas I thought, especially as expressed in the 
MetaPhrsics, where he indicates the respective differences of the objects of 
• 
mathematics, metap~sics, and natural science. 24 
Since the effect must b~ proportionate to the cause, matter is 
distinct in itself before it is quantified. The numerical distinction 
between,Socrates and Plato as men is not a quantitative distinction but the 
foundation of a quantitative distinction. In the same ~ the principle of 
distinction between this man and that is the root of quantity and consequen 
~ of the distinction following it. .However, Cajetan emphasizes, this 
matter, which is an essential part of the composite terminating a natural 
substantial generation, i£ first in th~ order of nature, prior to adhesion 
of accidents. W'ith the composite it must be Singular, distinct from the 
universal, per se ens and unum, because only such can exist. In this way 
each thing is a "this" and distinguished from others. 
Does Cajetan, then, delete quantity from the process of individu-
at ion? He says he does not: "I don't deny that maxim held in the sense of 
Aristotle and st. Thomas, i.e. that numerical distinction of matter pertains 
first to quantity and through ~t to other things.,,25 However, matter, which 
is the root and foundation of quanti~, is not in a subjeot without 
participating in the nature of quantity. We can say this better: "It 
26 tprehast the nature of quantity." Prehas? Cajetan explains this awk\vard 
24 St. Thomas, ~!! Metaph., Lect. 4, n. 2208, 630. 
25 St. Thomas, Opera <Annia, ~onine, Comment of Ca:letan, I, Q.29, 
A.I, Com., 329 (IX) • 
26 Ibid • 
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term this way: It is necessary that every effect be convenient to something 
before it modify' that thing, e.g. the formal effects in vegetative and 
sensitive things. However the distinction that we are talking about is not 
the formal effect of quantity, Dla:tter as such does not contain quantity.tt27 
Without pausing to comment on Cajetan1s interpretation of st. 
Thomas, note the highlights of his thinldng before passing on to Ferrara. 
In ~ ~.2! Essentia he says that matter plays the lead role in in-
dividuation. Quantity is relegated to a subsidiary post, since it is a mere 
capacity that matter has of receiving this extension rather than that. On 
second thought, in commenting on the Summa, he retracts this because he has 
given matter quantification of some sort, not actual quantity but apptitud-
inal. This is too much since it detracts from the importance of matter as 
the individuating agent. Quantity is caused b.r matter and is subsequent to 
matter. Nevertheless, it always accompanies matter, so it has some shart i:l 
individuation. 
Ferrara does not agree with Cajetan. In his commentary on Contra 
Gentiles, after exposing st. Thomas' thought on the identity of God with his 
essence, he makes a study of St. Thomas' theory of the individuation of 
material substances. }JJ a preliminary he observes that a material 
suppositum embraces the essence itself and individuating prinCiples, which 
principles do not constitute the essence but limit it to form this 
27 Ibid. 
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individual.28 
In answer to the immediate difficulty that the essence in this 
• 
light seems not the formal cause of the suppositum but the material cause 
since i t receives accidents, he says: "We do not claim the supp~si tum. in-
eludes the essence and indi~duating accidents in such a way that accidents 
accrue to an essence that has already been constituted in a specific existence 
ro make it a pupposital existence." Instead, Ferrara imagines that first 
matter is disposed and limited through quantity and other accidents individua-
ting it. Then the form is united to matter so disposed according to its 
ultimate perfection. The result is an individuated essence.29 
Accidents exist in;matter before it is substantially informed. Not 
eXactly, says Ferrara. Though these accidents are received in substance, 
since they are dispositions of matter, they are not received in the substance 
which is the essence of the species. Since the material form gives corporeal 
existence and individual existence (hoc esse), they "are understood to be 
--
received in matter as it is actuated through a form conferring corporeal 
existence only, though in potency to individual existence of a thiS, e.g. 
horse ... 30 To individual existence the corporeal existent things is disposed bJ 
accidents. "These accidents are preunderstood in matter in the process of 
------------------
28 st. Thomas, QPera Omnia, Leonine, Tome III, Summa Contra 
Gentiles, with Comment. of Francis De Sylvestris Ferrariensis, O.P. Garroni, 
Rome, 1918, Bk. I, Cap. 21, Com., 64. 
29 St. Thomas, QPera Omnia, ~. ~., Bk. I, C. 21, Com., 64. 
30 st. Thomas, Ibid. 
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eneration which substantial form terminates in the ultimate grade.n3l In this 
ay the quiddities are individuated according to the signed matter of this or 
• 
hat individual, though they include the form and matter in common. 
Ferrara 1s aware that there is not complete agreement with this 
terpretation: tiSome Thomists say that materia signata is the matter itself 
apable of this quantity and not that; they say this capacity is not something 
eallr distinct from matter because signata adds only the capacity of this 
uantity, distinct only by reason." These men, he explains, think that a 
articular, agent appropriates matter to this particular form. They imagine 
hat in the first instant of the generation of Sortes, in the order of nature 
irst a composite comes into;existence, then in the same order all accidents 
In the particular composite that first and per se terminates 
eneration, the matter, an intrinsic part of Sortes, is appropriated to Sortes 
such a way that it is not capable of another quantity. Matter so 
ppropriated, these Thomists call Materia Signata. This opinion was voiced b.1 
ajetan in 12! Ente e,t Essentia. Ferrara presents it accurately, using the same 
erminology. 
However, "though this is the opinion of very learned men, it does not 
eem to me to be in'accordance with the mind of st. Thomas.n32 The basis of 
is that Materia signata, accepted as matter so 
31 st. Thomas, Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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appropriated to Sortes t.hat it is capable of the quant1ty ot sox-tee and. no 
other, cannot serve as a principle of individuation. His rebuttle takes the 
• 
shape of a dilemna: In that priority of nature in which matter is said to be 
itself appropriated, either there is some form in the matter through which it 
is appropriated to the soul of Sortes, or there is no form. If there is a 
form, it is either substantial or accidental, and in either event materia 
signata is not simply prime matter, but matter with a form through which it 
is signata or appropriated. If, on the contrary, there is no form whatsoever 
in appropriated matter, the opinion runs opposite to St. Thomas' affirmation 
that no potency reoeives limitation and appropriation except through some act 
which it receives.33 Prime matter, of course, is pure potency, and as such it 
does not have determination and limitation except through some form, whose 
function is to limit and determine. Accordingly, if signed matter must be 
pertinent to the individual (esse ad hoc) since the form is.individuated 
through such a signing, it must be through some act really distinct from the 
matter. So signed matter is not just matter itself exclusive of everything 
really distinct from it, but "matter with. some limiting form. n34 
A much better opinion, according to Ferrara, because it represents 
the mind of st. Thomas I materia signata is matter under quantity. Both 
matter and quantity concur actively and equally it seems in individuation. 
Through matter the composite is individual and incommunicable because it 
eliminates communication such as the universal gives a particular. A nature 
------
33 st. Thomas, Opera ()nnia, ~. ~., Com. Q.2l, A.I, 66. 
34 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I, Q. 7, A. 1. 
i 
I 
, 
I 
I 
• ' • *** 1m., t t ''S r '$ • IMII sa 1m. 91 wmn I 
"'1 emr £ ' 5 t 'n-_ ............ 
received in matter cannot be shared with an inferior, since ~tter is the 
first subject of form and cannot be received in an infer1or~ Quantity 
• 
enables an individual to be distinct from another individual of the same 
species. In fine, the individual includes two things: incommunicable matter 
and quantity. So materia quantitate signata, the principle of individuation. 
entails two factors: matter to make the individwll incommunicable, and 
quantity to make it numerically distinct from other of the same species.35 
36 
For approbation Ferrara points to De Principio Individuatianis. 
But the substantial form must precede the quantity that arises from 
it. Ferrara anticipates this objection. "There is no instant in which the 
material form is united to matter without the presence of quantity, because 
this form is not united to matter unless it is this matter distinct from 
- -
another part of matter. tt31 He refers to ~ Boetium ~ Trinitate for 
corroboration. Though things are this way in reality, the intellect may be 
able to consider matter and quantity separately. It might seem to some that 
first we understand the form received in matter to constitute the compositum 
and then the compositum receiving acoidents. But in this consideration, 
though matter is understood as individual inasmuch as it is inoommunicable -
the principal condition of individuation, without quantity it cannot be under-
stood to be distinct from everything else by being signed here and now. So it 
------------
35 ~. 
36 Ferrara does not question the authenticity of this opusculum. 
31 st. Thomas, opera Omnia, ~. ~., I, c.29, Com., (VIII) 61. 
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seems that the two cannot be conceivably separated. 
The form cannot be understood to be in matter and to 'constitute 
this suppositum unless quantity is preunderstooc1. in matter, 
through which it is made this and distinct from another part of 
matter; matter is not this unless b.Y some act limiting it and 
distinguishing it. 1be assumption is false that puts in some 
instant, outside the intellect, form in matter in which there is 
not also quantity. In our intellect there is not a priority in 
which an individual can be under~tood distinct from others 
numerically (without quantity).3 
Ferrara's reason: by its nature and entity matter is indivisible 
and one in number, and it cannot be divided into many parts as a superior into 
inferiors. Only through quantity can it have extension and be divided in to 
parts. 
In appraising materia quantitate signata Ferrara arrives at a 
position contra~ to Cajetan's. Where Cajetan stresses the part matter plays 
in individuation to the point of making matter the principle and quantity a 
mere condition of matter, Ferrara boosts quantity to the equal of matter. 
Cajetan sees in matter an order to quantity; Ferrara speaks of a quantified 
prime matter that receives an ultimate perfection by being united to form. 
Cajetan says matter cannot receive an accidental perfection before it is 
informed substantially; Ferrara says matter without quantity can even be 
conceived. For Cajetan quantity is a condition of individuation; for Ferrara 
quantity is a coprinciple of individuation, on a par with matter. 
Both of these men claim to be devulging the thought of st. Thomas. 
Both refer to texts from st. Thomas as their bases. Clearly we have a stale-
38 Ibid • 
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mate with no hope ot ascerta1ninglthe.JJU.nd ot st. Thomas on this question it 
we consider his texts apart from their histroical context.' Placed against the 
• 
light of contemporaneous philosophical disputes and concurrent problems, the 
texts of st. Thomas should be more meaningful and point to the proper under-
standing of his materia quantitate signata. 
.--.-~~--.-.-------
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CHAPTER V 
• 
HISTORICAL DETERMINATION OF THE MEANING OF 
gUANTITATE SIGNATA 
We m~ begin the reconstruction of the historical context of the 
problem of individuation, upon which we shall depend for a solution of the 
problem of interpretation of quantitate signata posed in the preceding 
chapter, by comparing the approaches of st. Bonaventure and st. Thomas. It is 
common knowledge that St. Thomas and st. Bonaventure were contemporaries. 
They taught at the Universi,;ty of Paris at the same time. Though friends, they 
were at odds philosophically as leaders of their respective schools. Prominent 
among their differences was their solutions to the problem of individuation • 
Bonaventure's opinion was judged orthodox and laudable; St. Thomas' was 
proscribed by name.l Still the two had so much in common that the' circumspect 
Gilson could state that on this issue their difference is reduced to one of 
terminology.2 Comparing the theories of the two scholastics will bring out in 
sharper relief St. Thomas' thought and provide a basis for judging and choos-
ing between Cajetan and Ferrara - these two exhaust alternatives - to arrive 
at St. Thomas' meaning of materia ~uanti tate signata. 
____ 1 ___ _ 
1 Grabmann, Thomas Aquinas, 58. 
2 Gilson, Spirit 2! Mediaeval ~., 464. 
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The individual" according to st. Bonaventure" is a "this something," 
a hoc aJ.iquid. flThat it is a this" it owes principally to matter" by reason 
of which a fom has position in place and time. Tha tit !s something is due 
to the form. • •• Therefore in creatures individuation springs from a double 
principle. tr3 The individual, he sSys, is not only divided in itself, but 
divided from all others.4 Unlike the universal, which is predicated of many,5 
the individual is incommunicable. It is constituted of properties the sum of 
which cannot be reproduced in another.6 
For St. Bonaventure the root of individuation is both matter and 
form. He is quite clear on this: "Individuation rises from the indivisibili-
ty and appropriation of principles; while they are joined together, the 
principles of a thing themselves mutually appropriate each other and con-
stitute the individual."7 Because matter is indifferent to any individual, as 
disposed to a1la~in itself the cause of none, "it is very difficult to see 
how matter, which is common to all, shall be the main principle and cause of 
numerical distinction. IIB st. Bonaventure would not say that since matter is 
not the main principle of distinction" form must be, "becRus'e again, it is 
-----------.-.. 
3 St. Bonaventure, Omnia Opara, Tom.II" Commentar,r on the Four 
Books of the Sentences of Peter Lombar , Bk.II, D.3, P.I, A.2, Q.3, 109. 
4 St. Bonaventure" Omnia Opera, Tom.· II, Com. In II Sent., D. X, A. 
I, q.3, 262. 
5 st. Bonaventure, 9£ • .Q!!., n, In II Sent., D.V, A.2, Q.2. 
---
6 St. Bonaventure" QE.. 2!.!. , II, 1!! II ~., D.X, A.l, Q.3. 
7 St. Bonaventure, 2£. Oia., II, ~ II ~., D.2, R.l, A.2, Q.2, 1 5. 
8 st. Bonaventure, 2£ • .Qi!., II, In II ~., D.), P.l, A.2, Q.), 
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very difficult to understand how form is the total and the main cause of 
numerical distinction, because every created form has been produced to have 
another simUar to it, ••• how can we say two fires differ formally, or even 
other things, that are multiplied and distinguished numerically, solely by a 
. 9 
division of a continuum, where there is no induction of a new form?" There 
fore St. Bonaventure credits individuation to matter and form: 
Individuation arises from the actual conjunction of matter 
with the form, as a result of which one appropriates the 
other, as is evident when there is the expression of many 
images in wax, which before was one; neither can the 
images be distinguished without the wax nor can the wax be 
numbered except for the fact that there are various images 
in it. If, however, you seek the principal source of it, 
one must say that the individual is hoc aliquid. That it 
is hoc is due principally to the matter, by reason of which 
the-rDrm has its position in place and time. That it is 
aliquid is due to the form. The individual, moreover, has 
essence and existence. The existence is contributed by the 
matter and the essence by the form. Individuation, there-
fore, in creatures, arises from a double principle.10 
st. Bonaventure and st. Thomas, therefore are not in accordance on 
the problem of individuation. While st •. Thomas teaches that the prinCiple 0 
individuation is materia signata, St. Bonaventure holds that the principle 0 
individuation is matter and form.1l Nevertheless, there is such apparent 
arfini ty between them, that unless the distinction of individuation and 
___ r __ _ 
109. 
9 st. Bonaventure, 1£ • .9!!., II, ~ II ~., D.3, P.l, a.2, q.3, 
10 St. Bonaventure, 9E.!.£!!, In .!! ~., D.3, P.I, A.2, Q.3, 109. 
11 Clement M. O'Donnell, O.F .M., ~ Psychology of ~. Bonaven+'lre 
~~. Thomas Aquinas, Cath. U. of America, Washington, D.C., 1937 • 
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However, when we subject st. Bonaventure's concepts of matter and 
• form to closer scrutiny, the apparent similarity to st. Thomas falls apart. 
st. Bonaventure considers matter from two aspects. In its nature matter is 
just this capacity or possibility to receive forms: "matter in its essence 
is informed with every possibility; and while it is so considered, its form 
is a capacity for forms.,,13 In this light it is one because as absolutely 
indeterminate it receives all its diverSity from forms, and it is infinite 
because it has an endless capacity to receive forms. But' as it is found in 
nature, matter always exists in a particular place at a particular time, 
subject to rest and motion. As such it is "impossible that informed matter 
!!c 
'.'1 exist deprivecl of every form."14 The matter of spiritual and corporeal 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1, , 
substances is different. As st. Bonaventure sees it, "corporeal" fills 
only part of the extension of the term "matter. II This is because matter 
applies to beings not because they are corporeal, but because they are 
16 
contingent. While matter can receive either spiritual or corporeal forms, 
and in this way is prior to form metaphysically, it is never separated from 
some kind of existence. Consequently, once it has received corporeal or 
------
12 This distinction is made in the opening chapter, p. 9 and 10. 
13 st. Bonaventure, In II sent., D.12, A.l, Q.l, 294. 
---
14 st. Bonaventure, ~. 
1, st. Bonaventure, .!!! l! ~., D.17, A.l, Q.2, 414. 
16 st. Bonaventure, ~l!~.' D.3, P.I, A.l, Q.l, Schol., 93. 
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spiritual existence it never 10S8S that existence. That is why, Pegi& 
explains, st. Bonaventure can hold that matter in itself is one though the 
• 
matter of spiritual and cprporeal substances differ, because "such a 
difference is derived, not from matter, but from the diversity consequent 
upon existence and the forms of ~~stence.~7 
Applied to the souls "Since the rational soul is a hoc 
aliquid, and naturally subsists by itself and acts as--
weI! as receives actions, we must follow a mean and sa:y 
that it contains, Within itself, the foundation of its 
own existence, a material prinCiple through which it has 
being. On the other hand, this is not necessary in the 
case of the brute soul because it is founded in the body. 
Consequently, since it is a material principle through 
which the existence of a creature is fixed in itself, we 
must admit that the human soul contains matter. This 
matter, hmrever, is above the conditions of extension, 
privation and corruption, and is, therefore, called 
spiritual matter.18 
The implications of this text are of paramount importance. Even 
though st. Bonaventure does not grant a pre-existence of souls,19 com-
positionof matter and form in the soul coupled with a bo;y "which is com-
20 posed of matter and form" reshapes the theory of matter and form and 
necessitates a new interpretation of unity and change in substance. To be 
composed of matter and ,form is re~ to be a substance complete in itself. 
-----
17 Anton C. Pegis, St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the 
Thirteenth Centur,y, St. Michael's College, Toronto, Canada, 1934, p. 36. 
414. 
18 st. Bonaventure, .92! • .Q!!., II, ~ II ~, A.l, Q.2, Conc, 
453. 
19 st. Bonaventure, ~ .Q!.!., II, ~ II ~., D. 18, a.2, Q.3, 
20 st. Bonaventure, Qe!.. ~., II, In. n ~., D.17, A.l, Q.2, 
ad 6, 415. 
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Nothing complete in itself can be joined to a third thing. St. Bonaventure'" 
man seems just an accidental aggregate of two independent and complete 
• 
substances. An ancient difficulty returns. st. Bonaventure anticipates the 
difficulty and solves it to his own satisfaction. When matter and form 
exhaust all capacity both have for further development they cannot enter into 
composi tion to establish a third thing. In t.hl:s case matter must satisfy 
and terminate completely form's appetite for matter, and conjointly form must 
satisfy completely and terminate matter's appetite for form. Then there can 
be no further composition. However, tlthough the rational soul has a com-
position from matter and form, still it has an appetite for perfecting a 
corporeal nature, just as ;8Il organic body is composed of matter and form and 
has nevertheless an appetite for receiving a soul. n21 Accordingly, a true 
composite substance is one in which there is a perfect proportion between 
matter and form and in which the component elements compliment each other in 
their highest development. 
The terminology is Aristotelian and Thomistic; the thought is 
basicly platonic and Augustinian. Breaking down form into matter and form· 
and endowing matter vd.th a form' apart from whatever form it might receive to 
establish the composite obliterates nylemorphic concepts of matter, form and 
composi tion. If matter has a form and form has a form, how is the composite 
one substantially? Despite st. Bonaventure's account of successive and 
preparatory presence of forms leading to the unity of the individual a 
21 st. Bonaventure, Qe! .Q!!., II, 1.!!. II ~., D. 17, A.1 Q.2, 
ad 6, 41,. 
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plurality of forms destroys the composite substance,. as Thomists see it • 
• 
, 
True, st. Bonave,nture does not combat St. Thomas openly on this issue. John 
• Peckham did, however, and Peckham was a subject of the General of the 
conventuals - St. Bonaventure - who, resident at Paris was aware of the dis-
pute. It was to St. Bonaventura that Peckham turned for information and 
22 
corroboration. The idea of the preparatory function of forms is so con-
trolling in St. Bonaventure that he does not see how form can be joined to 
matter without the mediation and disposition of intervening form. Blanket 
approval of Peckham and disagreement with st. T.homas is patent in this 
vitriolic passage: "It is insane to sq that the ultimate form is added to 
prime matter without something, which may be a disposition or in potency to 
.' 
it, or without some interjected form.,,23 
Historians seem agreed that though St. Bonaventure's alterations 
of the significance of matter and form have as a necess~ qy-product a 
plurali ty of forms, he does not so much discuss this theory as develops a 
24 doctrine that rests on this theo~. Equally important with pluralit,r of 
forms in St. Bonaventure's composite is another feature of the aftermath of 
his ideas of matter and form: the rationes seminales. This he does treat of 
explicitly. It is his answer to how forms are present in matter and what 
part a created agent plays in the education of these forms from matter • 
....... ------------
22 Etienne Gilson, ~ Philosophy of lli Bonaventure, trans. Dan 
nltyd Trethowan and F.J. Sheed, Sheed and warer; New York, 1938, 27. 
351. 
23 st. Bonaventure, QE!. Q!!., V, ~ Hexameron, Collatio 4, 10, 
24 Pegis, Problems of the Soul, 43. Pegis lists E. Gilson, M. de 
'I,',hli', G. Thery, and the Quaracchl eaIt"OrSas subscribine to this opinion. 
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Now we may suppose that nature does something and it does 
not produce something from nothing, and when it acts on 
matter , it must produce a form. And since matter is not a 
part of form and form does not become a part of.matter, it 
must be that forms are in matter in some way before they 
are produced; and the substance of matter is filled with 
all; therefore the rationes seminales of all forms are in 
matter itself .25 . 
On its face value this explanation of rationes seminale! borders 
on the doctrine of Anaxagoras, which presupposes that forms are actually 
present in matter, but Bonaventure himself rules out Anaxagoras because he 
posits the coexistence of contraries in matter and eliminates the causality 
of the external agent, which st. Bonaventure finds an impossible explanation 
of change in nature. He discards Avicenna on the charge that he too strips 
seoondary causes of any meahing.,26 'st. Bonaventure's forms are indeed in the 
potency of matter, but as Pegis explains, this capacity is not that in which 
(in qua) and from which (aqua) but that out of which' (~ qua) the forms are 
produced. This means not that the forms are derived from the essence of the 
matter itself, but that there is'something in matter, created with the 
matter itself, out of which the agent acting on the matter produces the form. 
This "something" is what can and does become the form, "because in the mattEr 
itself there is something concrete from which the agent while acting on 
matter itself educes the form.,,27 Again the "something" in matter is not a 
part of the form that can be produced, but what can be a form and becomes a 
-------------
888. 
25 st. Bonaventure, ..QE:E!!, !!!'!y~., D.43, A.I, Q.4, Con., 
26 st. Bonaventure, ~ • .Q!!., ~ 11. ~., D.7, P. II, A.2, 
Q.l, c. 191. 
27 st. Bonaventure, Ibid. 
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form "just as a rosebud becomes a rose • .,28 
Our major consideration here is not to expound the cosmology of 
• 
st. Bonaventure. We are concerned with showing that despite the affinity 
of terminology, he adulterates the Aristotelian concept of matter qy 
enjoining with it a form of some sort. His plurality of forms and rationes 
seminal.e,!! are outgrowths of his use of "matter" and serve to illustrate his 
departure from Aristotelian and Thomistic meanings. 
Pegis traces Bonaventure I s stand to Peter Lombard, for whan form 
is a disposition introduced into the basic reality, matte~. The 
indetermination of matter itself refers to its capacity for further develop-
mente Beyond Lombard he goes to st. Augustine fS informity of matter when he 
thought of it as the original chaos (terra) of creation, whose characteristic 
essential aspect was a formlessness. Clearly it had a form, because it is 
impossible that a corporeal substance exist without a form. Nevertheless, 
it was formless inasmuch as it was so confused that not even the elements 
were discernable. All corporeal substances were created in a confused unity 
29 that required the six d~s work to be ordered and arranged. 
st. Bonaventure's successors in the Franciscan Schools developed 
his doctorine. Matthew of AquasQarta saw no difficulty in the teaching of a 
plurality of forms. An individual could have lIlBlV' existences and still 
-_._-, 
28 Pegis, Problem 2!. ~~, 47. 
29 Pegis, Problem of the Soul, 70. 
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remain one being. Multiple forms does not conflict wtth the unity of an 
individual substance, because such unity is derived from the completing 
• 
individual form, not from substantial forms. Conclusively, Matthew rejects 
the unity of the substantial form and cheers the condemnation of this 
doctrine.30 William de la Mare in Correctorium Corruptorii Quare insists 
that the soul as a substantial form is to be considered as perfecting the 
existence of the composite, not the principle of existence. So he says: "th3 
existence of the soul and the existence of the composite is the existence of 
two things and not of one thing; and this is not unbecoming that the 
existence of two things should be dual.,,3l 
Under the guidance of St. Bonaventure, developing ideas that are 
purely Franciscan, Peter Olivi defended in his Quaestiones In II sententiarum 
the doctrine of the actuality of matter unconditionally: "I believe ••• that 
matter according to its essence has some act or actuality, distinct moreover 
from the act that is the same as form ••• some real entity." Olivi's state-
ment dovetails with Matthew of Aquaspartats explanation that matter "has an 
essence distinct from the essence of form, and from this it has its idea in 
God" ••• SO that ••• "since every nature and essence has a corresponding 
existence, this (matter), in itself is not nothing, so it is an ens; and if 
it is an ens it has exis tence .It Through God's omnipotence, then, prime I, 
matter could exist without a form. Scotus emphasizes that "since matter is a Ii 
-----------
30 Ibid., 53. 
31 Pegis, Probe of the Soul, 56. 
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principle and cause of being, it must of necessity be some being, a reality 
distinct from the form, something positive." This does not infringe upon the 
• 
unity of a substantial compOSite, because "just as it is not repugnant per se 
that s composite be one, it is not repugnant that it be made up of some act-
ual beings really distinct.,,32 TMs is ound because, according to his best 
interpreters, st. Bonaventure held that matter can be separated from form and 
exist independent of it. 
From this cursor.y examination of St. Bonaventure and the develop-
ment of his doctrine in the hands of successive leaders in the Franciscan 
School, it is quite clear that Bonaventure's acceptance of prime matter is 
radically different from ~t. Thomas'. 1¥hen st. Bonaventure introduces 
spiritual matter to safeguard the subsistence and individuation of souls 
departed from bodies, he garbles the Thomistic import of matter. His 
acceptance of matter leads to a pluralit,r of forms in a substantial composite 
and leans upon rationes seminales a8 an explanation of the new form in 
substantial change. All of these doctrines militate against l~omism. 
Repeatedly St. Thomas decries spirl tual matter. "There is no com-
position of matter and form in a soul or an intelligence so that matter may 
be thought to exist in them as it does in corporeal substances.... it is not 
impossible that some form exist without matter, for form as such does not 
depend upon matter.,,33 Some say that the soul is composed of matter and form 
------------
32 Pegis, Probe of the Soul, 67-69. 
----
33 st. Thomas, .2!! Being ~ Essence, C.IV, 44. 
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but this does not Beem to be true, because no form is made intelligible 
except through this, that it is separated from matter and the trappings of 
• 
matter. However this is not in that matter is corporeal in a perfect 
corporeity, because the form of c~rporiety itself is intelligible through 
separation from material.,,34 More forcefully St. Thomas says, "It is 
impossible for matter to be in spiritual substances, ••• the ordered scheme of 
things does not in any sense imply that spiritual substances, for their own 
actual being, need prime matter, which is the most incomplete of all beingS~ 
Plurality of.forms has no place in st. Thomas' teaching. ,True, he 
sometimes speaks of a form of corporiety, but he makes certain that he is not 
misinterpreted, because the form of corporiety of any body is "nothing else 
but its substantial form.,,36 To him St. Bonaventure's composite is an 
accidental aggrega~e, since "it is impossible that there be many substantial 
forms of one thing.,,37 
st. Bonaventure's rationes seminales find St. Thomas unsympathetic. 
He calls the opinion unreasonable that IIplaces all natural forms in act, 
latent in matter" so that the natural agent does nothing but extract them, 
38 ' 
making the occult manifest. 1t Wi:thout explicit reference to st. Bonaventure 
he explains that natural forms pre-exist in matter but not in act, "as some 
34 st. Thomas, In I Sent., D.8, Q.5, A.2, Sol., 228. 
---
35 st. Thomas, ~ Spiritual creaturos, A. 1, Resp., 21 and 22. 
36 st. Thomas, Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, C. 81, 546. 
37 St. Thomas, In Aristotelis Librttm De Anima, Pirotta, O.P. 
Marietti, Turin, 1925, Bk.II, lect. 1, n. 224, 'B!. 
38 st. Thomas, Quaost. Disp., De Veritate, Q.11, A.I, 265. 
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say," but onlyhi'''-potency, from. which they are reduced to act by some 
external agent.39 Substantial form does not come to a subject already 
.. 
40 
existing in act, but to one existing in potency only, i.e. prime matter. 
st. Thomas' discrepancies, with st. Bonaventure on spiritual matter, 
plurality of forms, and education of forms are reduced to their initial 
diversity in understanding matter. Over and over St. Thomas insists that 
prime rna tter is amorphous. "Prime mat tar, as it is considered s tripped of 
ever,r form, does not have any diversity, neither is it made diverse through 
aqy accidents before the advent of the substantial form, becauseaecidental 
existence does not precede substantial. lI41 Consequently the first substanti~ 
form perfects the whole matter, because matter does not have division from 
the quiddity of substance but from corporiety, which the dimensions of 
quanti~ follow in act. Afterwards different frams are acquired in it 
42 through a division of matter according to diverse situs. It necessarily 
comes to this: "the first division is according to matter itself, because 
there is no division of matter unless matter itself is distinguished in 
itself, not because of a different disposition, or form or quantity.lI43 
Since matter of its nature is simply in potency to existence, "it is 
------------
39 Ibid. 
40 St. Thomas, ~ ~ Anima, II, 1, n.224, 82. 
41 St. Thomas, ~! ~., n.8, Q.5, A.2, 228. 
42 Ibid. 
43 st. Thomas, Qpuscula Omnia, I, De Substantiis Separatis, C.V, 
i 
! 
J 
I 
I 
I j 
I 
57 
necessar,r to accept the distinction of matter not acqprding as it is vested 
in different forms or dispositions - this is besides the essence of matter -
, . ~ 
but by a distinction of potency in respect to the diversity of forms." 
Without a doubt st. Thomas' matter is no more than pure potency. st. 
Bonaventure's is potency with some act. 
Returning to the trunk of this thesis, the election of Cajetan's or 
Ferrara's interpretation of st. Thomas' quantitate Signata, there now seems 
no choice. Ferrara is a shadow of st. Bonaventure on st. Thomas' principle 
of individuation. In the light of st. Thomas I disagreement 'Wi. th st. 
Bonaventure, Ferrara's interpretation is condemned by st. Thomas himself. 
Note the resemblance between Ferrara and st. Bonavi.mture. Ferrara 
s~s the prime matter that receives substantial form is already disposed and 
limited by quantity. Rephrased, matter has accidental form before it has 
substantial form. Logically, then, since accidents do not exist without a 
substantial subject, prime matter must have a form of its own apart from the 
substantial form it receives to establish the composite. This is st. 
Bonaventure's position. Though Ferrara is a bona fide Thomist, his implied 
acceptance of matter should lead him to a plurality of forms. He seems to 
flirt with the idea when he distinguishes between the corporeal form that 
enables a subject to be quantified and through quantity have other accidents 
and the substantial form that succeeds the corporeal form to make the subject 
-----
~ St. Thomas, Ibid. 
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individual. Such plurality is no more than nominal in St. Thomas 'because he 
identifies the corporeal form with the substantial form. Ferrara, like st • 
• 
Bonaventure, speaks of forms understood in matter, which the substantial form 
terminates in its highest grade. Here he hints at the same ,progressive 
generation of matter that demands rationes seminales rather than st. Thomas' 
eduction of forms from pure potency. In fine, Ferrara's usage of matter, or 
rather misuse of the term, in expounding St. Thomas' prinCiple of individuati-
on of material substances is more Franciscan than Thomistic.. Assuredly, 
Ferrara would disclaim this accusation and avow that he accepts prime matter 
as pure potency. St. Bonaventure, too, claims that his prime matter is pure 
potency. In the thought of both of these men there is a poloution of prime 
matter. St. Bonaventure's is blatant. Fenara's is clearly evident from the 
tyust he gives prime matter by informing it with quantity despite the fact 
h5 
that st. Thomas explicitly singles out quantity as absent from prime matter. 
He states, also, that it is impossible to posit dimensions in matter without 
46 
substantial form, because the reception of quantit,y is dependent upon the 
reception of the substantial form.47 But Ferrara overlooks this. 
Cajetan represents the only interpretation of st. Thomas' principle 
of individuation that is consonant with the Thomistic synthesis. 
45 st. Thomas, In II Sent., D.30, Q.2, A.l, 181. 
---
46 St. Thomas, ~ Natura Materiae, II, 201. 
41 St. Thomas, ~. Theol., I, Q.16, A.6, Resp. 
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A hundred years later, comparing the conflicting interpretations of 
Cajetan and Ferrara, John of St. Thomas unhesitatingly points out the ·flaws 
• 
Ferrara's presentation. Matter, he says, is not signed through quantity 
adhering to matter, but through an intrinsic order of matter to quantity as 
separating and dividing it. To him, St. Thomas uses quantity more as a term 
of the signing of matter, to which it has an order, than as a form signing it 
intrinsically. In this way quantity is a condition and means of connotation 
of individuation, but matter is the radical principle of individuation. John 
uses "matter ordered to quantity as dividing it" because division cannot be 
made without the information of quantity, and quantity, as a disposition, 
comes from the form. Nevevtheless, by reason of its dividing, it prececes 
the form itself in the genus of material cause - as is often said about 
dispositions, though in the genus of formal cause it would be just the 
opposite. 
How these potential dispositions may in a certain sense be said to 
be in matter before the advent of the form demands a subtle explanation. 
But, according to A. Forest,48 if we understand this we understand the whole 
import of the Thomistic doctrine of individuation. Though Forest uses the 
unfortunate term "incomplete act," an impossible concept, he explains that 
these dispositions which prepare the matter for the reception of a new form 
are actually accidents in the substance about to undergo corruption in the 
generation of a new substance. Keeping in mind that generation is not from 
any matter but only matter that is disposed for the new form, we will lind. t 
48 A. Forest, Nature Metaphysique du Concreto 
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our consideration to dimensions. Dimensions ot a substance change in the 
process of corruption. In changing they make the matter.of the substance . 
• 
more suitable for the reception of the. new form. 1~en the change actually 
takes place, there will be similar - but not numerica~ the same - dimensio 
in the new substance. The accidents of the first substance are dispositions 
for the new substance, but since the corresponding qualities of the two 
substances are not numerically the same, they cannot have actually existed in 
the matter prior to the form. Since the end of generation is the form of 
the thing generated, disposing accidents are present in the corrupting sub-
ject in view of the new form. Change involves everything but prime matter, 
which remains throughout generation and is identical in the tenninus a quo 
. --
and the terminus ad quem. That quantity does not remain numerically the same 
through corruption and generation rebuffs Ferrara's contention. Beforo tho 
advent of the new form in prime matter, dimensions of the new' substance C'X1.st 
in the same way that every other perfection of the completed individual 
exists, only potentially. Potentiality to quantity is real and distinct from 
matter's potentiality to substantial form, but it is dependent upon the 
essential potentiality of prime matter in the same manner that the actuality 
of quantit,r rests upon the actualization of the matter b.r the substantial 
49 
form. The new form is educed fram the potency of the prime matter of the 
old composite because it is proportionately disposed in the most immediate 
degree. Eduction of the new form is the last development of the disposition 
49 Gerrity,!.!!! Theoq £! Matter and ~., 27 - ,30. 
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of matter. By being signed, matter assumes a deoided direotion toward the 
~ew individual and beoomes potentially determined. In this sense only, is 
the signing prior to the form in existence, because the new form can'be 
received only into matter potentially proportionate to it. In De Principio 
IndividuatiOnis,50 st. ThO~s st;:sses that the new form enters not an 
actually but a potentially determined matter. .B.1 emphasizing that it is not 
an actual determination St. Thomas avoids begging the question in the 
Ferrara fashion. potential determination points out that the new direction 
of matter has a relation to a definite quantity, since every determined 
matter has a certain quantity, a transient spacious indeterminate dimension • 
This ne,,' relation of prim~ matter is of its essence a transcendental nature, 
, ' 51 
because it produces a new being substantially. 
John of st. Thomas lists several reasons why it would be a mistake 
to imagine that matter is individuated by being signed with actually inform-
ing quantity.52 First, as St. Thomas makes clear in ~ ~ ~ Essentia,53 
quanti~ and other accidents adhere to the whole composite, so assigning 
actual quantity to matter is false. Secondly, quantity can be actually 
separate from substance, as the doctrine of the Eucharist testifies. Thirdly 
quantity like other accidents is individuated by the substance. Fourthly, 
---------------
50 st. Thomas, ~ Principio Individuationis, 195. 
51 Slavin, Basis of Individual Differences, 66. 
52 John of St. Thomas, D.P., Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, 
Naturalis Philosophiae, Beato Reiser, O.S.B., Marietti, 1urin, 1933, Pars III 
Q. 9, A. 4, 784. 
53 st. Thomas, ~ Bein~ ~ Essence, C.VI, 56. 
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informing quantity confers only an accidental existence~ not substantial. 
Substantial individuation by materia quantitate signata must be 
• 
through an order to quantity as dividing and separating these parts of matter 
As matter, though not informed with accidents except through 
the mediating composite; nevertheless has an order to them as 
to dispositions, by Which the potentiality of matter itself is 
determined in respect to the form of this rather than that, so 
it has an order to quantity as one ~f these dispositions. But 
quantity has not only the office of informing the subject in 
Which it is by giving it the formal effect of quanti tati ve 
extension, but it also affects it as dividing one portion of 
matter from another, by which division, placed as a condition, 
incommunicability and substantial distinction in respect of 
the matter so divided result formally not from the quantity, 
but from the matter itself.54 
This is Bubstantial division, says John of st. Thomas, and with 
-. 
Cajetan he understands that matter is signed radically by quantity, not 
because matter alone is the root of quantity - its root is the composite, 
which is not only.tter, but matter informed with a corporeal form - but, 
matter is said to be signed radically because it comes to be not by having 
a form itself - it is the composite which has the form - but through an order 
to quantity as determining and dividing it. That means that by subjecting 
matter to this division of one fonn from another in matter, there is producod 
of matter itself, with this division of quantity placed as a requisite con-
dition, an incommunicable substantial determinateness." 
Noting that St. Thomas nowhere says that quantity is the principle 
of individuation absolutely, but only with restriction as a seoondary 
-------------
54 John of st. Thomas, cursus ~., III, Q.9, A.4, 185. 
,5 Ibid. John of St. T. refers to Cont. ~., 65 and Sum::1:l '['11<1('l. 
III, 77, 2 & 4, which we have already considered. 
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principle or more aptly a condition,,6 John of St. Thomas s~s baldly that 
~tter alone is the principle of individuation, quantity only concomitant-
ly.It'1 Quantity does not formally cause individuation, it accompanies matter 
and manifests the subject to the senses as designated. 
This interpretation of st. Thomas' formula has these salient 
features Which harmonize with the trunk of st. ,Thomas' thought: matter which 
makes the subject incommunicable in a substantial principle of individuation, 
thereby avoiding inextricable difficulties of foisting substantial 
individuation upon an aCCident; quantity, executing a minor role in 
individuation, is laid in its rightful lair as a concomitant and condition of 
t·:' ,:' matter, but purely acciden.tal. 
I" 
, 
\ 
( 
I 
Later Thomists, accepting materia quantitate signata asa transcen-
dental relation of matter to quantity, modify quantity with the term flin-
tarnal." Gredt works the idea into his explanation of the principle of 
individuation: 
In the instant of generation matter by the strength of 
previous dispositions has an order to the new form and 
accidents of the new composite, which accidents in the 
order of the material dispositive cause precede the form 
and are proximate dispositions to it; and among these 
accidents quanti~ as the first accident precedes the 
others as a disposition to them. Indeed matter is not 
disposed to this form in number, except as it is disposed 
to this quantity, just as it is not disposed to this 
species of form, unless because it is disposed to the 
accidents which are required by this species. Therefore 
-------
,6 Ibid. Here John of st. T. averts to Prine Ind., 196 and Nat. 
Mat., C.II, 200:--
-
,1 John of st. Thomas, Cursus .E!!!d., III, (~.9, A.4, 185. 
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matter is already understood as distinot and divided before 
quantity is present in act, even before the new substantial 
form about to be generated is present, in that by the 
strength of previous dispositions it infers ana demands this 
rather than that quantity. By Signing of matter so ex-
plained, quantity itself is not the principle of individuation, 
but the condition only, required that matter may perform this 
function, since those who hold that signing is by a quantity 
inhering in act make quantity the coprinciple of individuation 
and then their opinion is reduced to this: that individuation 
is deduced from some accidental form.58 
By quantity here Gredt intends internal quantity "because quantity 
does not concur in individuation because of its magnitude and figure, but in 
that it is distinct and divided from all other quantity through its position 
ordo 'partium in toto.,.59 Breaking quantity into discrete and continuous, he 
observes that discrete qupntity has parts numerically distinct by their 
positions, as individual totalities, and continuous quantity has parts 
distinguished by position as partial individuals. This is so because quantit , 
besides the individuation it receives from its subject, has some mode of 
individuation of its own. In its situs, parts outside of parts, it has in 
the same species parts distinct among themselves, differing only in position 
i and situs, anyone of v.hich is quantity different in number from any other 
quantity. 60 
Hitting at the same distinction, Rugon says that matter is 
individuated intrinsically through the connotation of quantity, i.e., an 
order to this certain quantity; it is individuated extrinsically through the 
--,-,---, 
58 los. Gredt, O.S.B., Elementa Philosophiae, 4th ed., Herder, 
Friburgi Briscoviae, 1926, Pars II, e.l, 302. 
59 Gredt, Elementa ~., II, e.l, 302. 
60 Gredt, Elementa ~., II, e.l, 309. 
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connoted quantity itself'. 61 He concurs with Gredt in showing that st. 
Thomas gives quantity a form of individuation in its own right, since by 
... 
nature quantity has parts outside of' .parts so that one part is not another 
because of differences of position and Situs.62 
To seize upon this characteristic of quantit.1, as Roland-Gosselin 
63 does, to make it a coprinciple with matter :\n individuation would be to 
stray from st. Thomas' intention. As he points out repeatedly in Boetius ~ 
Trinitate, he means simply that common accidents are not individuated per se, 
but through quantity which receives its individuation from matter 
64 individuated per se. Dimensions are individuated by matter, not by them-
selves.65 Accidents cannot be the cause of substance.66 For this reason 
.~ 67 
Cajetan retracted his interpretation of individuation in De Ente et Essentia. 
---
Since quantity is only a property of matter, a potency to quantity would be 
only an accident and inadequate for substantial individuation. Matter is the 
prinCiple of individuation; quantity is a noma! condition of matter. In 
conclusion: st. Thomas' principle of individuation of material substance 
consists in a potential transcendental relation of prime matter to form, wluc 
----------
61 Rugon, Curs us ~., ~. ~., Pars I, Tr. II, Q.4, A.l, 241. 
62 ~., 242. 
63 Roland-Gosselin, I.e "De Ente et Essential! de Saint Thor.:J.as ~' 
~, Saulchoir, 1926, 131. - - - - -
64 St. Thomas, In Boe~ De Trin., II, 4; Summa Theol., III, (. 77, 
---- -- --A. 2, c. 
65 st. Thomas, In Boet.De Trin., IV, 2, ad J • 
..... -- ---
66 st. Thomas, In Boet. De Trin., IV, 2, ad 2. 
----
67 Cajetan, In Summa Theol., I, Q. 29, 1. 
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when actualized by form, constitutes an individual determined in itself and 
limi ted ad extra. 
• 
The problem of the thesis is solved. However, related to the 
interpretation of materia quantitate signata, though not an essential part of 
it, is the question of st. Thomas apparently indiscriminate use of determined 
and undetermined with reference to the dimens~ons of the quantit,y embraced in 
his formula. In the next chapter we shall examine st. Thomas t texts and with 
the help of modern Thomists tr,y to arrive at a conclusion. 
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CHAPTER VI • 
DIMENSIONS, DETERMINED OR 
UNDETERMINED 
Keeping in mind that quantity is just ~ condition of matter in 
exeouting the function of individuation, we shall take up as a corrolary 
whether St. Thomas considers the quantity as determined or undetermined in 
its dimensions. 
At the outset it is important to distinguish between terminate, 
interminate, and determina~e dimensions. Renard does this nicely: Determinat 
:ne:.tns that the dimensions are definitely these, i.e., distinct from any other, 
as Paul's dimensions are determinate because they are his and no one else's. 
~erminate indicates the ultimate dimensions of a body, 1.e., so long, so 
wide and so high. Interroinate dimensions means, that though the objeot has 
fixed dimensions, we arc considering only the fact that it has parts outside 
of parts. l 
St. Thomas seems to vaoillate in his writings on the choice of 
determinate and interminate dimensions. In De Ente et Essentla he says that 
-------
by designated matter he means "matter considered under determined 
dimenslons."2 Maurer speaking in his edition of this work on St. ThoOQs t 
principle of numerioal individuation, uses the srume modification of matter 
1 Renard, S.J., !.!:.::.Phll. 2f.Being, 223. 
2 Maurer, C.S.D., .2!:. Deil'lE ~ Essence, 14. 
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that St. Thomas does here, "under determined dimentions," but at the 
• 
passage cited he notes that in using "determined dimensions"3 St. Thomas 
is adopting the terminology of Avicenna, though elsewhere he uses "undeter-
mined dimensions" as Averroes does. Commenting upon the same passage in 
his edition of the same work, Boyer is unperturbed. He merely observes that 
St. Thomas' usage is somewhat irregular inasmuch as it does not agree with 
Boetius de Trinitate and question seventy-six of the first part of the Summa 
Theologica, intimating a slip or miscopy.4 On the same incident Roland-
Gosselin sees a sharp inconsistancy with a number of other passages. 5 
Distinguishing i~ ~ Veritata between materia signata and mat~ria 
~ signata, St. Thomas says that signed matter has determined dimensi~ns, 
i.e., of these or of those, while unsigned matter doesn't havo a determination 
of dimensions. 6 Later in the s~e work, St. Thomas states again that natter 
in the singular 1s "matter existing under determined dimensions. "1. Similarly 
in ~ Natura Materiae he says r "it is impossible that a form be received 
in matter ••• which matter under certain dimensions is the cause of 
individuation. itS 
3 St. Thomas, £:!. Being ~ Essence, ad. Maurer, 14. 
4 St. Thomas, ~ ~ ~ Essentia, ad. Boyer, 55. 
5 Roland-Ga.elin, .!::! "De ~ ~ Essentia, It 106. 
6 St. Thomas, E2.. Veri tate , Q. 2, A.7, 49. 
7 St. Thomas, De Veritate, Q. 10, A.5, 234. 
8 St. Thomas" De Natura Materiae, 201-202. 
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However, the case of determined dimensions loses when St. Thomas 
.. 
makes it clear in other places that "(3.etermined" is expendable. In the 
Sentences he speaks of the impossibility of understanding different parts in 
matter,'unless there's preunderstood in matter dimensive quantity, at least 
interminate, through which it is divlded. 9 At least leads the reader to 
.....,J';;""_';" 
draw the inference that though the quantity may be determined in its 
dimensions, it must be of interminate dimensions at any rate. Further into 
the same book, he says that the situs and quantity of matter must be deter-
mined, but the dimensions of matter must be at least interminate. lO 
Neither Cajetan nor Ferrara examined into the question of determined 
• 
or undetermined dimensions, possibly through complete agreement, possibly 
through a oomplete preoccupation with the role of matter. More modern 
.scholastics of both schools are in agreement on this poInt. Gredt conc0des 
that the dimensions are interminate. l1 Boyer does too. 12 Though Maquart 
accuses Boyer of misinterpreting the Summn's I, 76, 6, he agrees on this 
point. 13 Hugon14 and Remer15 concur. Saintonge distinguishes bebveen 
II, 55. 
9 St. Thomas, ~ If. ~., D. 3, Q. 1, A. 4, 97. 
10 St. Thomas, In II Sent., D. 30, Q. 2, A. 1, C., 781. 
---
11 Gredt, Elementa ~., II, 302. 
12 Boyer, Cursus ~., I, Cos., 485. 
13 F. X. Maquart, Elementa Philosophiae. Andreas Blot, Paris, 1937, 
14 Hugon, Cursus ~., II, 244. 
15 Rem~r, IV, Summa ~., 72 • 
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determinate quantity and determinate dimensions and agrees to both. IS All :. 
these men point to the passage where St. Thomas makes an issue of 
dimensions I 
Dimensions can be considered in two ways. On the one hand, 
they can be considered according to a definite size and 
shape; and thus, as· perfect beings, they are placed in the 
genus of quantity; thus they cannot be the principle of ' 
individuation, because such a termination varies in the 
individual, and it would follow that the individual would 
not always remain exaotly the same. On the other hand, the 
dimensions can be considered ,interminate only in the nature 
of dimension, although they can never be interminate, just 
as the nature of color oannot be without the determination 
of white or blaok; and thus they are placed in the genus of 
quantity, but only as imperfect. From these interminate 
dimensions is brought about this matter, signats rratter; 
and thus it individuates the form. Thus through the matter 
is caused a numerical diversity in the same species. l7 
St. Thomas puts it better than any of his commentators. 
Though there is no disoordant voioe among modern soholastio$ on 
interminate dimensions, to allow tor expansion and oontraotion, rarofaotio~ 
and condensation, it would be misleading to muffle the shouts of opposition 
on terminate and interminate quantity. 
Boyer and Renard, following Ferrara's "quantity informing prime 
matter," infer that the quantity that signs matter is aotual nnd presume 
16 Saintonge, Summa .22.!., 391. 
17 st. Thomas, In Boetium De Trinitate, IV, 2, 84. 
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that it is ter.minate. Gredt18 and Maquart,19 rejeoting Ferrara for Cajetan, 
• 
call the quantity lnterminate. Saintonge, who follows Cajetan on this 
point, distinguishes between termi.nate and interminate quantity. Since 
interminate quantity is without terms, it is nothing more than spacial 
diffusion. This is the radical principle of numerical individuation in 
communi, but not of the existential individual.20 
Rugon disagrees with Saintonge and substantiates Gredt and hlaquart. 
Quantity can be divided into perfeot and imperfect, he says. Perfect 
quantity inheres in a subject and informs that subjeot as a complement 
perfected by the substantial form of the composite. This quantity supposes 
a subject and is not a mode of individuation of that subject but individuated 
by it. Imperfect quantity prescinds from certain terms and figure. Not 
supposing a subject, it is prior'to the subject as a root precontained in 
the matter of ,individuation ot the subject itselt. In this way quantity 
is called individual per seipsa. From its subject quantity has the 
characteristic of informing, but on the strength of its own essenoe, 
independently of the subject, it demands that it have parts outside of parts. 
From this there are two parts of quantity and two quantities distinct from 
each other. Therefore per se through the power of its essenoe quantity is 
distingulshod. 
Quantity, according to Hugon, cannot individuate unless it is 
18 Gredt, E1ements.~., II, 302. 
19 liaquart, Elementa Phil., II, 56. 
20 Saintonge, Swmna C03., 391 • 
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dete~ined in the sense that it indicates this in number rather than that • 
• 
However, this does not entail determination under a certain term and figure. 
In its last and perfect terminati0D:, quantity cannot be determined unlese 
through form, but it can h~ve a determination of situs so that it points 
to this in number rather than that. And he quotes Salmatacensesz 
Determined quantity is one thing, terminate quantity is 
another. Determinate quantity is quantity as this in 
number and not that, not caring whether it is completed 
and termim.ted through the substa.ntial form, nor whether it 
has this existence or that, and in this way it is a 
principle of individuation inasmuch as it is preccnta.ined 
in matter. However, terminate quantity has the soone, as 
posterior to substantial form 6 through which it is terminated 
and formed, and dmilarly it involves in this .. nc ture h!.lV'in~ 
n. certain existence ("tantitatem"), e.g., 2 by 4. Accepted. 
in this way it isn't the principle of innivinuation.21 
So that quantity individuate, an ultimate and complete terminatio~ 
is not required. It suffices that it indicate this in number rnther than 
that. This determination does not come from the substantial form. Through 
the preceding dispositions matter first pertains in number to this mP_tter 
before this form in number. Therefore this quantity in number is contai~ed 
radioally in matter before this form in number, and accordinr;ly detenlination 
to this qunntity in number is prior to the determination of the subst~nti~l 
form. 
21 Salmaticenses. De Principio Indivlcuationis, Traot. I, D.I 6 
Dub. V, n. 132. 
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Hugon warns that the distinction between terminate and interminate 
• quantity is of the greatest importanoe. If through matter signed by 
quantity is understood matter having complete quantity in act and actually 
inhering through the manner of an intrinsic and informing cause, matter 
already signed by quantity is not the principle of individuation as regards 
. 
esse, but only in regard to demonstration, in as much as it is an 
inseparable sign of matter. If matter signed by quantity means that matter 
itself prehas by way of root or foundation, this quantity rather tr~n th~t, 
it is the first prinoiple of individuation as to existence. Z2 
.. 
Hug;on~· Cursus Phil. ~ Nat., I~ Tre.ct 2, q. 4~ a.l~ 245. 
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CHAPTER VII • 
HOW MATTER QUANTI~l'ATE SIGNATA FIl'S INTO THE 
THOMISTIC SYNTHESIS 
By way of summary the writer of this ~hesis proposes to show 
in this olosing chapter how the interpretation of materia quantitate signata 
harmonizes with the basic tenets of Thomistic hylemorphism. Much of what 
is put here briofly has already been used in the trunk of the thesis to 
determine St. Thomas' use of the formula. However~ sketching the inter-
relationship of ' the prin~lple of individuation and other key theses of 
Thomistic cosmology will confirm our interpretation of St. Thomas and rule 
out any other. 
Of paramount importance to understanding St. Thomas' philosophy of 
nature and an isolated phase of it, such as the topic of this thesis, is 
an accurate grasp of St. Thomas' notion of prime matter. By prime matter~ 
st. Thomas means nothing more than potentiality to substantial forms "There-
fore the potentiality of matter is nothing else but its essence."l Though 
it'is a real potenoy to natural forms, it does not exist by itself in 
nature. 2 Most philosophers agree that prime matter is simply potency, but 
1 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. 77, A. 1, &d 2. 
2 St. Thomas, Summa Thoologica, I, Q. 7, A. 2, ad 3. 
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many employing the concept to. solve a particular problem of nature let 
.. 
their imagina. tions overpower them and 'shift ground. St. Bonaventure 
discovers a formless matter that.~otually exists without a form to give it 
existence. Ferrara conceives of a oommond quantified, existent through 
a form of oorporiety, upon which different forms supervene to distinguish 
it. 3 In these cases there is no hope of explaining St. Thomas' principle 
of material individuation beoause of the departure£rom his oonoept of 
prime matter. 
Endowing prime matter with a form of its own annihilates St. Thomas' 
contention that the form 'of a materia.l composite is one, since its act of 
existence is one and it is form which gives the composite existence. 4 
st. Bona.venture's theory of composition conflicts violently with St. Thomas' 
entelechy. If form gives being absolutely, corruption and generation must 
be absolute. 5 Ferrara's aotually informing qua.ntity oannot be oarried 
through the corruption of one substance and the generation of another. No 
accidental dispositions come between matter and form, and it is impossible 
for matter to be quantified before it has being. 6 Even in a mixture forms 
do not remain actually but only virtually. 7 This is beoa.uso the unity of a 
3 St. Thomas, Summa Theolo~ica, I, 66, i, o. 
4 St. Thoma.s, SU1TllIla Theolo~ica, I, 76, 4, Sed contra. 
5 Ibid. 
6 St. Thoma.s, Summa 'l'heolo~ica, I, 76, 6, c. 
7 St. Thomas, Boet. ~ Trir.., IV, 3, ad 6, 91. 
: II!,II 
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thing composed of matter and form is by reason of the form itself, by which 
• 
it is united to matter as aot. 8 A thing's unity results from the srune 
principle that gives it being. Act and potency are so related that no 
., .. -
external bond is necessary to unite them. 9 Since form is act and "the 
reason for the unity by which a given thing is.one,nlO no medium is possible. 
Aren't the dispositions a'medium? Since generations is only from 
suitable matter, dispositions precede form, but form at the same time causes 
dispositions. ll In no event is there substance emerging ~ nihilo, but 
, 
-, rather from the' potency of matter.l2 
According to Thompson: 
The orthodox Thomist.thesls is that in a given "substantial 
muta.tion," when the disintegration of old substances gives 
rise to new substances, there is a resolution usque ad ~ster­
iam primam, so that neither substantial nor accidental forms 
rerr~in. The basic argument in favor of this thesis is tlmt 
since there can be only a single substantial form in any 
composite of primary matter and substantial form, no substantial 
form will persist through a substantial mutation. From this it 
follows that no accidental forms can persist~ since an accidep.t~l 
form is simply an accident which derives its beinG from the 
substantial being. Thus in a substantial change, matter is 
8 St. Thomas, Summa, Theolo~ica, I, 76, 7, c. 
9 St. 'l'homas, II Cont. Gent., C. 
--
58, Rickaby, 121. 
10 St. Thomas, ~ Spirit. Creat., A. 3, 46. 
11 St. Thomas, E!. ~., Q.. 28, A. 8, 324. 
12 St. Thomas, E!. Pot., Q. 2, A. 8, 64-65. 
j 
i 
~ 
l 
1 
77 
denuded of all forms, not of oourse in the sense that it 
oan ever exist in a formless state, but in the sense that 
all the old forms are replaoed by new forms: their 
disappearance and replacement constitute an indivisible 
event. It is clear that the entity susoeptible of this 
oomplete denudation cannot possess any positive properties; 
it is, therefore, pure potentiality, in other words, pure 
determine.bility. It does not seem neoessary to add more. lS 
'< 
Prime matter is concreated by God as the material principle ~~ 
of every corporeal composite. In itself it serves to individuate the 
formal principle that it receives. In the unceasing corruption of one 
con~osite and the generation of another, matter again and again exercises 
the work of individuation. ~uantity is always present, beoause of its nature 
a material composite is quantified. However, this quantity is no more than 
a normal condition of matter. In the instantaneous14 corruption of one 
composite and the generation of another the, same quantity does not persist. 
Consequently quantity cannot be considered a principle of individuation as 
matter is. Though, properly speaking, the oomposite, not the form of the 
composite, 'comes into eXistenoe,lS the form comes into being by the fact 
"tha.t some matter or subject is brought from potenoy into aotl and this is 
a bringing forth of the form from the potency of matter without the addition 
of anything extrinsio. "16 Just as a form 1s educed from the potenoy of the 
13 Dr. W. R. Thompson, "The Unity of the Organism," The :!I'odern 
Sohoo1man, Vol. XXIV, No.3, March, 1947, 130. --
14 Vincent Edward Smith, Philosophioa.l Physics, Harp~r & Brot1:ers, 
New York, 1950, 73. 
15 St. Thomas, Summa Theologioa, I, q. 45, A. 8, ad 1. 
16 St. Thomas, ~ Spire Creat., A. 2, ad 8. 
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matter of a composite and joined with the matter in a.transcendental union 
• 
to establish the oomposite, so it is individuated by that matter. 17 
Individuation of material forms by materia quantitate signata under-
, 
stood in this way fits into the mosaic pattern of Thomistio oosmology. Any 
other interpretation does violenco to St. Tho~st teaohing on prime matter. 
the unioity of form. the union of matter and form. or the eduoation of 
material forms. 
17 Petrus Hoenen, S.J., Cosmo1ogia, 4th ed., Aedes Pont •. 
Universitatis Gregorianae, Roma, 1949, 285-287. 
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